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POVERTY LAW IN ONTARIO:
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
Randall Ellsworth and Ian Morrison*
RESUME
Cet article fait la revue des 6v~nements de l'ann~e derni~re dans certains
domaines de la d6fense juridique des personnes a faible revenu, y compris
l'aide sociale, les accidents du travail, l'assurance-chrmage et le Regime de
pensions du Canada. Nous nous concentrons sur la r6forme de la loi, sur les
litiges et sur la pertinence de ces activit~s aux yeux de ceux et celles qui
pratiquent ce domaine du droit. Nous considdrons les effets de la recession
et les actes des gouvernements f&lral et provincial dans les secteurs
s~lectionn~s.
A. INTRODUCTION
This is our second annual review of poverty law developments for the Journal
of Law and Social Policy.1 The article covers the period from September 1991
to September 1992. The main focus of the article is again on income
maintenance law and related issues, with particular reference to the activities
of Ontario's community legal clinics. Once again, time and space constraints
and the limits of our own expertise mean that we have had to be quite selective
in deciding what should be reviewed. However, we have tried to place
jurisprudential issues in the context of broader legislative, social and eco-
nomic developments.
* Copyright © 1992 Randall Ellsworth and Ian Morrison. Randall Ellsworth is a research
lawyer with the Clinic Resource Office of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan (CRO). Ian Mor-
rison is a research lawyer and Executive Director of the CRO. The CRO provides legal
research and resource and training materials to practitioners in Ontario community
legal clinics. The authors would like to thank Judith Keene and Paul Rapsey of the
CRO for their assistance with preparation of this article, and the many clinic casework-
ers who have provided us with information and ideas. Any opinions expressed herein
are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan.
1. R. Ellsworth and I. Morrison, "Poverty Law in Ontario: The Year in Review"
(1991), 7 J.L. & Social Pol'y 1. [hereinafter "Ellsworth & Morrison (1991)"].
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The most important news item for poverty law advocates and activists during
the past year has, of course, been the recession (or the depression, depending
on one's degree of pessimism) and increasing poverty. Many people who held
regular employment for years have lost their jobs with the recession and
economic "restructuring" and face long term unemployment, as evidenced
by the enormous rise in the number of unemployed people seeking welfare
for the first time. 2 In September 1992, Statistics Canada reported that the
number of unemployed people in Metropolitan Toronto had reached the
highest rate since the 1930s Depression-with no clear hopes of improve-
ment in sight.3
Increasing unemployment and growing poverty have been accompanied by
enormous pressures on the social welfare programs which provide direct or
indirect income support. The federal government has continued with its
agenda of cutting social spending and shifting this burden to the provinces.4
Those provincial governments committed to maintaining or even desirous of
expanding social spending have been further hampered by burgeoning defi-
cits and diminishing revenues.
The causes of poverty generally and its demographic distribution cannot be
reduced to a simple function of the economy. Many (too many) Canadians
were living in poverty before the recession. Such factors as race, gender,
childcare responsibilities and disability, alone or in combination, have always
been strongly implicated in the unequal distribution of poverty as well.
However, all the forms of disadvantage which place people at a higher risk
of poverty are exacerbated in bad economic times.
We will not engage in an extensive review of poverty statistics here-most
poverty law advocates have had enough first-hand exposure to the growing
number of poor people in the past year. We will mention just a few figures.
Perhaps the most disturbing are with respect to child poverty. In Ontario, it
is estimated that one in six children lives in a family receiving social
assistance, the bottom of the social welfare net.5 Nationally, one in six
2. Ontario, Time For Action: Final Report of theAdvisory Group on New SocialAssis-
tance Legislation (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario; 1992) (Chair: A.
Moscovitch) [hereinafter "Time ForAction "] 20.
3. "Jobless rate worst since Depression", The [Toronto) Star (5 September 1992) Al.
4. See National Council of Welfare, The 1989 Budget and Social Policy (Ottawa: Sup-
ply and Services Canada, 1989); National Council of Welfare, The Canada Assis-
tance Plan: No Time For Cuts (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991).
5. Time For Action, supra, note 2 at 21.
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Canadian children lives below the poverty line.6 Most of these families are
headed by single women, one of the most socially and economically disad-
vantaged groups in Canada (before even taking into account conditions of
race and disability within this group).7 As of March 1991, the National
Council of Welfare estimated that there almost 2,300,000 people on welfare
across Canada. 8 There are now more foodbanks than McDonald's restaurants
in the major Canadian cities.9
Not surprisingly, the demand for legal services to help people seeking
benefits from social welfare programs has increased. Most clinic caseworkers
have reported an influx of new clients, especially those seeking assistance
with social assistance problems. The demand for individual services has
forced many clinics into a difficult choice between providing individual
representation and freeing up time to pursue community development and
lobbying for law reform.
The article has three main sections. First, we mention briefly some current
issues of access to justice for poor people in Ontario. Second, we review
legislative and jurisprudential developments and current law reform pros-
pects in relation to the four income maintenance programs encountered most
often in poverty law practice. Finally, we take a brief look at some current
issues in constitutional and human rights law as it affects low income
individuals and poverty law practice.
B. ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Although the main focus of this article is on substantive poverty law devel-
opments, a true picture of the state of poverty law practice must include some
reference to the issue of access to justice. While we cannot give this topic the
attention it deserves, there have been important developments in this respect
in the past year which bear mentioning here.
6. M. Reitsma-Street, A. Van de Sande, R. Carriere, "Three Perspectives on Child
Poverty in Canada" (School of Social Work, Laurentian University, 1992) [unpub-
lished] 1.
7. National Council of Welfare, Women and Poverty Revisited (Ottawa: Supply and
Services Canada, 1990).
8. National Council of Welfare, Welfare Reform (Ottawa: Supply and Services Can-
ada, 1992) at 3.
9. "Three Perspectives On Child Poverty", supra, note 4 at 1.
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1. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LEGAL SERVICES IN ONTARIO?
Ontario has a mixed model of legal aid services. The needs of low income
people for "traditional" legal services (criminal law, family law, general civil
litigation) are primarily served by the private bar, reimbursed on a fee for
service basis through legal aid certificates. Areas of law not traditionally
served by the private bar and of special concern to low income people or
groups at special risk of social and economic disadvantage are served by
community legal clinics.' 0 An important difference between these delivery
models is that, since their inception, clinics have seen their mandate as
including not only individual client representation but also community devel-
opment, law reform and lobbying.11
Notwithstanding a substantial growth in the number of legal clinics in Ontario
in the past fifteen years, the funding and administrative structure of the clinic
system has remained largely unchanged, as has the relationship between the
respective mandates of the legal aid certificate plan and clinics. Events of the
past year, however, make the status quo seem increasingly fragile.
The first event of note is internal to the clinic system itself. While there are
many-and vigorous-competing visions of what clinics should be and do,
almost all participants in the clinic system agree that a review of the divisions
of authority and roles of the various players in the system is overdue. In June
1990, the Clinic Funding Committee 12 funded a planning conference
attended by representatives of "stakeholders" in the clinic system. The
conference ended with a proposal for an independent operational review of
the clinic system. The review team's consultations were carried out in late
1991 and 1992 and its initial report is expected in the fall of 1992.
10. There are about seventy community legal clinics in Ontario funded through the
Ontario Legal Aid Plan Clinic Funding Committee, which operates under the
authority of Part III of O.Reg. 59/86 (pursuant to The Legal Aid Act R.S.O. 1990
c.L-9). Most clinics provide general services in poverty law, but several specialize
either in particular areas of law or in serving a particular target population, such as
the disabled or elderly, or a particular community: for a full list of clinics see Com-
munity Legal Services Directory (Ontario Legal Aid Plan: August 1991), available
from the Ontario Legal Aid Plan.
11. For a historical review of this mandate, see M. Blazer, "The Community Legal
Clinic Movement in Ontario: Practice and Theory, Means and Ends" (1991), J.L. &
Social Pol'y 49. The expanded mandate of clinics is expressly acknowledged in the
Community Legal Services Directory, supra, note 10.
12. See note 10, supra.
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Most people who have been following the review assume that the reviewers
will recommend changes to clarify the roles and responsibilities of clinic
staff, boards of directors and the clinic funding Committee and administra-
tion, as well as substantial changes to address current inadequacies of the
clinic system's infrastructure, training programs, communications and other
support services. While the operational review has been expressly stated not
to be a strategic review, many would feel that this must be the next step. The
process of the operational review has already built some pressures for a more
thorough examination of what poverty law practice in the 90s should be and
the role of clinics in providing it.
Pressures for reexamination and perhaps for a defence of the community
clinic model may also come from outside the clinic system in the next year.
The demand for legal aid certificate services increased greatly with the
recession, which inevitably led the government to look for ways to control
rising legal aid costs. The Attorney General of Ontario announced in the
summer of 1992 that the Ontario Legal Aid Plan would be establishing, as
"pilot projects", clinics to deliver services in the area of family law, criminal
law and immigration law.13 The terms of the announcements suggest that
these will not be "community legal clinics" on the model of the current
system, directed by independent community based boards of directors, but
rather that they will be "public defender" clinics-gove.rnment offices with
staff lawyers whose mandate is to do casework.
The private bar has reacted to these announcements with predictable hostil-
ity.14 Less has been heard publicly from within the clinic system (although
at least one clinic group presented a brief to the Attorney General with respect
to the proposed family law clinics) but changes to the legal aid plan will
undoubtedly affect community legal clinics. How the private bar handles
demands for legal services always has some impact on clinic operations, as
people who cannot get legal help approach clinics for services. More
importantly, it seems inevitable that if "clinics" using staff lawyers are
established following a different model from community legal clinics, the
results of the two delivery models will be compared.
13. News Release: "Attorney General Announces Major Review of Legal Aid and
Court Systems as Justice System faces Massive Financial Problems" (Ontario, Min-
istry of the Attorney General) (25 June 1992); "Reforms coming to avert Ont. Legal
Aid funding crisis" The Lawyer's Weekly (19 June 1992) 1.
14. E.g., see "Reforms coming to avert crisis ...", supra, note 13; "Briefly Speaking" 13
CBAO Ontario Newsletter #8 (August 1992).
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It is far too early to tell what will come of these changes. Changes which result
from pressures to save money alone obviously pose a risk to any legal aid
program, let alone one which sees its mandate as extending beyond individual
casework. On the other hand, if a closer scrutiny of the clinical model for legal
services is inevitable in any event, perhaps it is time not only for an affirmation
of the importance of the broader mandate, but for a renewed examination and
debate about the meaning of poverty law practice and legal activism.
2. PUBLIC LITIGATION FUNDING
Access to legal services is only part of the problem of access to the justice
system for low income people. Legal aid programs provide counsel for most
low income people, the major cost component of routine litigation, but in
more ambitious "test case" the costs of seeing a case through to completion
can amount to tens of thousands of dollars or more for disbursements alone.
These costs can present an insuperable barrier to low income individuals and
groups from pursuing rights claims in the courts. Thus access to litigation
funding is also a crucial component of meaningful access to justice.
(a) The Court Challenges Program
In its February 1992 budget the federal government announced a series of
program cuts it cited as deficit reduction measures-but a move seen by many
others as a cynical attempt to silence its critics on social issues. 15 The cuts
included cancellation of the Court Challenges-program, which had provided
development and litigation funding for people seeking to assert equality
rights and language rights claims against the federal government. Court
Challenges money had been used by many groups, including legal clinics, to
pay for costs of developing new legal arguments and to develop the often
expensive and sophisticated bodies of empirical and statistical evidence
required in much equality litigation.
The demise of Court Challenges shocked many people, coming as it did
shortly after the government had announced that the program would be
extended for five years to 1995. It was protested not only by many individuals
and groups, but by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Rights
and the Status of Disabled Persons, which praised the program as innovative
and cost effective, noting that it had received "glowing evaluations" from
almost all sources. 16 Nevertheless, at the time of writing the federal govern-
ment has refused to reinstate the program and future prospects look bleak.
15. "Feds' budget cuts leave legal programs dead and injured", The Lawyer's Weekly
(20 March 1992) 1.
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(b) Class Proceedings and Class Proceedings Funding
In a more hopeful development for low income litigants, Ontario recently
passed new legislation to facilitate class proceedings.17 The legislation is
intended to overcome narrow judicial interpretations which established very
narrow criteria within which an action had to fit to be brought as a class
action.18 At the same time, the government passed companion amendments
to the Law Society Act to establish a fund known as the "Class Proceedings
Fund". 19 The fund will be administered by a Committee established under
the Act. A plaintiff to a class proceeding or who is seeking to have a
proceeding certified as a class proceeding may apply to the fund for financial
support "in respect of disbursements relating to the proceeding".
There are many unanswered questions about the Class Proceedings Act. It is
not entirely clear what kinds of proceedings are covered and to what extent
"class proceedings" will provide a useful forum to deal with problems
specific to poor people. Furthermore, disbursements funding is discretionary
and it remains to be seen how sympathetic the Committee will be to claims
by poor people seeking to advance novel or unusual arguments.20 It seems
likely, though, that the existence of the Class Proceedings Fund will encour-
age counsel to try to structure actions as class proceedings wherever possible.
While the fund does not cover legal fees, 21 disbursements are a major cost
concern in complicated litigation and other sources of disbursement funding
are under tremendous pressure in the current fiscal climate. Also, under the
new provisions, anyone who is granted disbursement funding is also granted
immunity from an adverse costs award.22 The wording of the legislation
suggests that this immunity adheres regardless of how much or little is
16. "Paying too dearly" Report of the Standing Committee on Human Rights and the
Status of Disabled Persons, Bruce Hallidy M.P. Chair, House of Commons, Issue
#23 (Jurie 11, 1992).
17. Class Proceedings Act, S.O. 1992 c.6, (Royal Assent June 25, 1992, not yet pro-
claimed in force).
18. Naken v. General Motors of Canada Ltd., [1983] S.C.R. 1982.
19. Law Society Amendment Act (Class Proceedings Funding), 1992, S.O. 1992, c.7
(Royal Assent 25 June 1992, not yet proclaimed in force).
20. Some concerns have already been expressed that because the Committee is directed
to have regard to "the merits of the case" in determining whether to grant funding,
novel legal arguments with respect to unfamiliar poverty law claims may be short-
changed.
21. Law Society Act, as amended by S.O. 1990 c.7, s.59c.
22. Ibid, s.59d.
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granted for disbursements. Since potential costs liability is a serious deterrent
to many low income individuals and groups from pursuing litigation, obtain-
ing this immunity may be just as important as disbursement funding in
enabling these groups to pursue legal remedies.
C. DEVELOPMENTS IN INCOME MAINTENANCE LAW
This section will consider developments in the areas of social assistance,
workers' compensation, unemployment insurance and the Canada Pension
Plan, the income maintenance programs most commonly encountered by
poverty law advocates. Both legislative changes and significant litigation
initiatives will be addressed.
1. SOCIALASSISTANCE
The focus of this section will be on the two main components of the Ontario
social assistance system, the General Welfare Assistance Act and the Family
Benefits Act.23 Social assistance caseloads and costs continued to rise
throughout 1991-1992 (although the rate of increase of new claims slowed
somewhat). The number of unemployed "employable" people on welfare
increased not only in absolute terms, but also as a percentage of all recipi-
ents-from about 25% of the social assistance caseload in December 1990
to 36% in January 1992.24 This was largely due to increases in the number
of people who exhausted unemployment insurance benefits without finding
new work25: the percentage of the Ontario population under 60 who received
social assistance increased from 8.1 to 13.9 percent from 1990 to 1991.26
The effects of these increases on program delivery were described in last
year's article and the comments made then still apply.27 Discretionary spend-
ing has been put under even greater pressure, delivery standards are often
arbitrary and capricious, law reform efforts have been impeded and public
23. The legislative framework for the provision of municipally administered welfare is
found in the General Welfare Assistance Act, R.S.O. 1990 c.G-6 [hereinafter
"GWA"] & General Welfare Assistance Regulations, R.R.O. 1980 O.Reg.441, as
amended [hereinafter ".GWR"]; for provincially administered family benefits, in the
Family Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990 c.F-2 [hereinafter "FBA"] & Family Benefits Reg-
ulations, R.R.O. 1980 Reg.318, as amended [hereinafter "FBR"].
24. Time ForAction, supra, note 2 at 20.
25. Ibid at 21.
26. Ibid
27. Ellsworth & Morrison (1991) at 13.
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resentment of social assistance spending-still funded in part from regressive
local property taxation-is high.
(a) Legislative Developments
(i) The Back On Track Implementation
1991 was an active year for legislative change in Ontario. We wrote last year
about Back On Track,28 the interim report of the Minister's Advisory Group
on New Social Assistance Legislation.29 The government had at that time
made an initial commitment to implementing a substantial number of its
recommendations. We can now report on the results of this process, although
there have been so many significant program changes in this period that they
cannot all be described in detail.
The government carried through on many of its promises, including increased
benefits, extended categorical eligibility for Family Benefits, enhanced
employment incentives and some increased procedural protections. How-
ever, it has still not moved on other commitments made at the same time.
These include making it easier for youth 16 to 18 to obtain welfare in their
own right after leaving home, allowing families of disabled people to estab-
lish modest trusts to provide a better quality of life to those in long term need,
and a variety of commitments to improve standards of fairness and account-
ability in service delivery.
Perhaps the most important of the broken commitments, as a test of the
government's commitment to moving social assistance in new directions,
were in relation to conditionality and employment. Issues of welfare and
work are a major focus for social assistance critics from all points on the
political spectrum. Disappointingly, the government refused to make even
modest changes to existing legislation which would have signalled a move
towards "transition" and away from "coercion" as a program philosophy. 30
Indeed, in August 1992 the government undermined many of the previous
year's improvements to the income supplementation program of the social
assistance system (known as "STEP")-also a key component of the "tran-
28. Ontario, Back On Track: First Report of the Advisory Group On New Social Assis-
tance Legislation (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1991) (Chair: A. Moscovitch).
29. Ellsworth & Morrison (1991) at 17.
30. For example, current legislation requires that a welfare applicant make reasonable
efforts to obtain any full, part-time or casual employment that he or she is physically
capable of pursuing: GWR s.3(1)(b). Back On Track argued that this was counter-
productive and recommended that the wording be changed to refer to "suitable
employment".
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sitions" reform philosophy-by substantially restricting access to the STEP
program.31
A final problem with Back On Track was the implementation process itself.
Policy guidelines explaining changes to field staff were not issued for months
after new, often confusing, regulations were passed. The guidelines eventually
issued are in many instances confusing, incomplete or in some cases just wrong,
and the responsible Ministry made no effort to provide or assist in providing
comprehensive training to the workers responsible for implementing the
changes. 32 The problems encountered with the Back On Track implementation
may unfortunately indicate problems that will have to be faced in the more
ambitious project of implementing the promised new legislation
(ii) Future Directions
In June 1992 the authors of Back On Track released their final report, Time
For Action.33 Most advocates hoped this report would build on the highly
regarded Transitions34 report to provide a detailed blueprint for new social
assistance legislation.
The substance of the report will probably meet with a mixed reception by
consumers and advocates. Many of the recommendations were predictable
and simply echo recommendations from Transitions. For example, it comes
as no surprise that Time For Action recommends that benefits should be
"adequate", that all real necessities should be covered and that the delivery
system should be improved. The report is generally progressive on issues
relating to employment and employability: it rejects coercive conditionality
rules in favour of voluntary "opportunity planning" and emphasizes the need
for assistance towards self-sufficiency. On the other hand, the report will be
disappointing to those who were critical of the Transitions approach to
women's issues around social assistance and hoped that their concerns would
31. These amendments [O.Reg.372/92 (Family Benefits) and O.Reg.373/92 (General
Welfare Assistance)] have the effect that the STEP income exemption calculations
are not applied to new applicants, as a result of which many people who would for-
merly have qualified for a "top-up" now will not be eligible for welfare at all.
32. These criticisms were put in detail to the Ontario government on behalf of the
Ontario clinics Steering Committee on Social Assistance, by Ian Morrison in a letter
dated May 4, 1992. The Minister of Community and Social Services acknowledged
receipt of the letter but has never responded to the substantive criticisms.
33. Supra, note 2.
34. Ontario, Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee: Transitions (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 1988) (Chair: G. Thomson).
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be more carefully examined this time around. 35 Background materials pre-
pared for the Advisory Group by clinic advocates argued strongly for a new
approach to the definition of the benefit unit, the obligation to seek child
support and impact of child support payments on benefit levels.36 Instead,
Time For Action recommends abolishing categorical eligibility for sole
support mothers while retaining the substance of the current rules of most
concern to women.
Time For Action is also a disappointment on another level. Most advocates
had hoped that the report would provide a detailed blueprint for new legisla-
tion. It does not do this. Many important issues are dealt with superficially
or not at all-the report is long on generalities and short on specifics. This
will make the job of attending to the details of new legislation all the more
difficult for social assistance advocates.
In any event, consumer activists, advocates and others interested in progres-
sive reform have a busy and difficult year ahead. The Ontario government
has entered into detailed negotiations with municipal governments to "dis-
entangle" provincial/municipal funding programs, of which social assistance
is a key component. The government has indicated it will decide soon how
social Assistance will be funded and who should deliver social assistance
services. A Cabinet submission will probably be made for decision on key
policy elements of new social assistance legislation in early 1993. A draft bill
is expected sometime in 1993.
It is ironic that the first sustained move towards substantial changes to social
assistance programs in Ontario is happening when the provincial government is
preoccupied with other concerns and under tremendous political and financial
pressures to show "restraint" in all matters relating to public spending..
(b) The Social Assistance Review Board
The effects of the recession on the Social Assistance Review Board (SARB)
became increasingly evident in 1991-92. The total number of appeals in
1990-91 rose about 16% over 1989-90 to over 4500,3 7 then accelerated even
35. E.g., see F. Stairs, "Sole Support Mothers And Opportunity Planning in the Thom-
son Report" (1989), 5 J.L. & Social Pol'y 165.
36. See: Social Assistance Legislation Research and Technical Background Documents,
Benefit Structure Project Team, Doc.# BS01 "Benefit Unit" (1991) [unpublished];
F. Stairs, "Child Support Issues", Background paper for the Benefit Structure Proj-
ect Team, Legislative Reform Project, (October 1991) [unpublished].
37. Social Assistance Review Board: 1990-91 Annual Report (Toronto: Queen's Printer
For Ontario, 1992) 12 [hereinafter "SARBAnnual Report, 90-91 "J.
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more, increasing 50% from 4500 in 90/91 to 7200 in 91/92.38 The number of
requests for interim assistance increased about 75% in the same period.
Although the Board received some additional funding, it was only half of
what was requested.39 By far the greatest number of appeals under the
General Welfare Assistance Act were in respect of job search and job loss
issues. 40 The majority of appeals under the Family Benefits Act continued to
be with respect to denials of eligibility as a disabled or permanently unem-
ployable person.41
These pressures have caused serious problems for the appeals process. The
process has developed chronic delays, the most disturbing of which are in
processing applications for interim assistance. Decisions which should be
made within days at most, to protect the integrity of the appeals system,
routinely take weeks or even months. SARB has taken several steps to
address these problems, as it has become clear that administrative procedures
developed when caseloads were a fraction of their present size must be
reviewed. It has attempted to implement a "fast track" system to deal with
simple cases. It has also undertaken a review of all internal procedures to
identify the causes of delays and propose a plan for reducing them.42 While
social assistance advocates are concerned that client's rights not be preju-
diced by any of these changes, all would agree that changes must be made-
there are few areas in which the maxim "justice delayed is justice denied"
applies more forcefully than in the resolution of issues involving fundamental
needs.
(c) Litigation Developments
(i) Social Assistance and the Charter
Those who hoped that the Charter of Rights43 would have a substantial
impact on the substance or administration of social assistance programs
continue to be disappointed. While there were no Charter decisions from
38. Letter from Laura Bradbury, SARB Chair, to Nancy Vanderplaats, Chair of the
Steering Committee on Social Assistance (14 August 1992).
39. Ibid
40. SARB Annual Report 90-91, supra, note 37 at 46. Job search and job loss cases
made up 52.3% of GWA appeals in this time period, with the next highest category
being 10.7% (excess income/assets).
41. Ibid at 45. These made up 56.6% of all FBA Appeals.
42. Supra, note 38.
43. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), c.1I [hereinafter "the Charter"].
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Ontario courts during the past year dealing with social assistance inatters, 44
some important claims in other jurisdictions met with defeat.
One important case is the decision of the Quebec Superior Court in Gosselin
v. Procureur General du Quebec.45 Gosselin was a class action which
challenged, under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter, a legislative amendment cutting
welfare allowances for employable recipients between ages 18 and 30 to
slightly over one-third of the allowance available to single people over the
age of 30 unless they participated in a "workfare" program. The Court
rejected both arguments-and indeed went so far as to suggest that the
amendments were a positive move which could have been extended.
A second important but disappointing decision is Fernandes v. Director of
Social Services (Winnipeg Central),46 a decision of the Manitoba Court of
Appeal released shortly after Gosselin. The appellant was a disabled person
living in the community who lost his caregiver and was forced to enter a
hospital as an in-patient. He sought and was refused a social assistance
allowance to pay for the care necessary for him to be able to return to the
community. The Court held that neither his s.7 nor his s.15 rights were
infringed by this decision.
Finally, mention should also be made of the decision in Mireau v. Saskatch-
ewan,47 in which the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench held that neither
s.7 nor s.15 of the Charter obliged the Saskatchewan Legal Aid Commission
to provide the applicant with funded counsel to pursue "private" civil litiga-
tion, including an appeal from a denial of social assistance.
We will examine these cases in more detail below, when we consider the
impact of the Charter on social welfare programs.
44. We reported last year that a preliminary decision of the Social Assistance Review
Board, in which the Board held that it had Charter jurisdiction pursuant to s.52 of
the Constitution Act, had been judicially reviewed: Ellsworth & Morrison (1991) at
11. The case has still not been decided, although it is now scheduled to be heard by
the Ontario Divisional Court in the fall.
45. (27 May 1992), No.500-06-000012-860 (Que. S.C.) [unreported] We have been
informed by counsel for the plaintiffs that an appeal from this decision has been
filed. However, in light of the current backlog of cases in the Quebec Court of
Appeal, it is not likely that the case will be heard and a decision rendered for two to
three years.
46. (10 June 1992), Suit No. Al 91-30-00477 (Man. CA.) [unreported]. We have been
informed by counsel in the case that an application for leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada will be made.
47. (13 December 1991), No. Q.B. 3758/91 (Sask. Q.B.) [unreported].
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(ii) The Canada Assistance Plan in the Supreme Court
Litigation begun well over a decade ago may soon reach its end in the
Supreme Court of Canada. Jim Finlay, a social assistance recipient, chal-
lenged the practice of the Manitoba social assistance authorities of recovering
social assistance overpayments by making deductions from recipients' allow-
ances. Finlay argued that this practice violated the terms of the Canada
Assistance Program, pursuant to which provincial social assistance costs are
shared by the federal government. 48 In 1990 he achieved a landmark victory,
when the Federal Court of Appeal held that CAP imposed a legally binding
obligation on provinces to pay people in need the amounts deemed necessary
to meet their basic requirements. 49
The federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. (Ontario
initially intervened in the case to support the position of the federal govern-
ment but the Ontario government withdrew its intervention after being
strongly criticized by social assistance advocates and consumers for its stand
in the case.) Finlay was argued in March 1992 and is currently on reserve at
the Supreme Court. Ironically, even if the Court affirms the Court of Appeal
decision, it may be a Phyrric victory for Ontario social assistance recipients.
The remedy sought in the case is an order to make the federal government
stop cost-sharing payments to the province until it complies with the terms
of CAP. However, the federal government has already reneged on its com-
mitment to equal cost sharing under the CAP agreement. 50
(iii) Social assistance and access to shelter
Access to shelter is an important issue for social assistance recipients. The
basic problem of finding affordable shelter and paying deposits for rent and
utilities usually demanded by landlords and utilities commissions is exacer-
bated by other barriers, including the pervasive discrimination practiced
against social assistance recipients in the private rental market. A number of
housing issues specifically related to social assistance programs have been
or are being litigated in Ontario this year.
Until recently, Metropolitan Toronto-the largest welfare delivery agent in
Ontario-gave welfare recipients money for last month's rent deposits under
a discretionary program known as special assistance. However, faced with
severe budgetary pressures, in 1992 Metro Toronto cut this program, along
48. Canada Assistance Plan, R.S.C. 1985 c.C-1 [hereinafter "CAP"].
49. Finlay v. Canada (1990), 71 D.L.R.(4th) 422 (F.C.A.).
50. See Ellsworth & Morrison (1991) at 14.
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with a variety of other special assistance programs. It even went so far as to
refuse to provide rent deposits under a new program, specifically intended to
provide assistance in establishing a new residence. In June 1992 a group
including both individual welfare recipients and institutions such as shelters
whose clients were directly affected by these cuts, filed an application in the
Ontario Court (General Division) challenging the legality of the cuts. 51 It is
hoped that there will be a decision before the end of the year. The case has
potentially far reaching consequences. At issue is the scope of municipal
discretion to provide or refuse to provide not just rent deposits but a wide
range of important items which are not mandatory under the legislation.52
The need to find money for rent deposits is not the only problem confront-
ing poor people trying to establish a new residence. Many utilities com-
panies require deposits for basic utilities services. This practice has been
challenged by social assistance recipients in Peterborough, Ontario. 53 The
application at this point makes three separate claims: firstly, attacking the
law allowing utilities companies to demand such deposits; secondly,
attacking the refusal of local welfare authorities to pay the required
deposits as items of special assistance; and, thirdly, claiming that land-
lords must pay such deposits themselves where necessary to render the
premises fit for habitation.
Finally, an attempt by a coalition of hostels to challenge their funding levels
under welfare regulations failed recently. In Our House Ottawa Inc. et al v.
Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton,54 the applicant hostels argued
that the Director of Income Maintenance had improperly exercised his
discretion and had acted on the basis of extraneous political considerations
51. Simon et al. v. Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (Ont. Ct. (General Div.), File
No. RE.1270/92). A study, commissioned as evidence for the action, originally
intended only to ascertain how many commercial landlords demanded rent deposits
as a condition of renting apartments, revealed that most landlords openly admitted
that they would not rent to social assistance recipients, even though such discrimina-
tion is illegal under provincial human rights legislation.
52. "Special assistance" includes, for example, prescription drugs, transportation costs
such as bus passes, dental services, eye-glasses and vocational training: GWR
s.1(1)(o).
53. Clark v, Peterborough Utilities Commission et a. (Ont. Ct. (General Div.) File No.
6605/91). The applicant is represented by the Peterborough Community Legal Cen-
tre. A number of anti-poverty organizations have intervened on behalf of the appli-
cant, while several local utilities commissions and Ontario Hydro have intervened
on behalf of the respondents.
54. (19 May 1992), File No.750/89 (Ont.Ct. (Gen.Div.) Div.Ct.) [unreported].
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in setting the per diem levels by which hostels were funded.55 The Court
rejected this argument on the facts, finding that nothing in the materials filed
suggested that the Director had not made an informed and independent
decision.
The applicants also argued that funding for "personal needs", as required by
the regulation, should include funding for counselling and vocational reha-
bilitation services for their residents. The Court rejected this argument also.
Ironically, the Court found support in the provisions of the CanadaAssistance
Plan, which it held could properly be used to interpret provincial social
assistance legislation. 56
(iv) Confidentiality of welfare records
In last year's article we noted that welfare recipients in Hastings County,
Ontario, had gone to court to resist an attempt by local politicians to get a list
of the names of all welfare recipients in the county.57 After many delays, a
decision in the case was finally rendered on August 19, 1992.58 The appli-
cants had raised a wide range of issues in the case, including Charter
arguments. In the end, however, the decision rested on a narrow ground. The
Court held that applicable protection of privacy legislation barred release of
the information unless the person seeking disclosure needed the information
"in the performance of his or her duties".59 The Court found that the Council
had adduced no evidence that it needed the information, stating that even if
it was correct as a general proposition that some people get welfare who
should not, "that is not evidence that there are persons in Hastings County
receiving welfare who should not, and who will not be caught, and that help
from Council is needed to catch them."'60
There are many other issues of confidentiality that arise with respect to social
assistance records. It is hoped that these will be dealt with in a comprehensive
55. Under GWR s.12(3)(b), the Director is granted the authority to approve the rates
paid to hostels to provide board and lodging and personal needs.
56. Supra, note 54 at 15.
57. Ellsworth & Morrison (1991), at 26.
58. Horlick et al v. The Corporation of the County of Hastings et al; Canadian Civil
Liberties Assn. et a4 Intervenors (19 August 1992), Belleville No.3073/90 (Ont.Ct
(Gen.Div.)) [unreported].
59. Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990 c.M-
56, s.32(d).
60. Supra, note 58 at 4.
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way in new social assistance legislation. In the meantime, there is some
comfort in the fact that a Standing Committee of the Ontario Legislature,
which completed a review of Ontario's privacy protection legislation this
year, adopted several of the recommendations made to it by community legal
clinics and proposed that protection of social assistance recipient's privacy
should be strengthened. 61
(v) Immigration and the welfare system
Immigrants, refugee claimants and their counsel have long had problems with
social assistance programs. The main burden of providing for new arrivals
falls on the general welfare system and therefore on municipal governments,
who have grown increasingly resentful of this burden and the federal
government's refusal to provide adequate assistance. New arrivals in Canada
without jobs or families to support them are often caught in the middle of
political "buck passing" between other levels of government which leaves
them without access to basic necessities.
One common reason for denying welfare is that the applicant has not provided
"information required to determine initial or continuing entitlement" to
assistance. 62 Workers often demand that welfare applicants produce informa-
tion from Canada Immigration which they cannot obtain. SARB has fortu-
nately taken the common sense approach that while an applicant must comply
with all reasonable requests for information, it is not reasonable to deny
welfare for failing to provide information for reasons beyond the applicant's
control. 63
Another chronic set of problems arises with sponsorship agreements. Many
regular immigrants.and refugee claimants are sponsored by family members or
by groups such as churches. The law specifically requires a sponsored person
applying for welfare to seek assistance from his or her sponsor.64 Unfortinately,
sponsorship agreements sometimes break down or the sponsor is simply unable
to provide financial assistance at a time when the immigrant needs it. Although
sponsorship agreements cannot be legally enforced by the sponsored
immigrants, welfare departments seem to have a policy of categorically refus-
61. The clinic Steering Committee on Social Assistance and the clinic representing the
applicants in the Hastings County Case made presentations to the Standing Commit-
tee on October 16, 1991.
62. GWA s.10(2)(b).
63. E.g., see SARB K-01-11-05 (3 Sept. 1991; Morrish, Renault).
64. GWR s.3(3).
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ing assistance to persons who have group sponsors. SARB has recently
allowed appeals in a number of such cases, commenting that the applicants
had made not just "reasonable" but "considerable" efforts to obtain assistance
from sponsors, to no avail.65
Finally, municipalities historically refused welfare to refugee claimants
because they had not yet been granted permission to stay in Canada. In 1991
welfare regulations were amended to deem anyone who had made a refugee
claim to be resident in Ontario for the purposes of the Act.66 However, the
regulation did not make it clear what happened to a person who lost their
refugee claim but had not been or would not be deported. 67 This issue also
went before SARB this year. A refugee claimant had lost his claim and
exhausted his appeal rights, but could not be removed from Canada because
he had no travel documents. He was ordered not to engage in employment
but had no means of support. He even asked to be taken into detention pending
removal but Immigration refused. SARB held that the new regulation applied
to anyone who had made a refugee claim, even if the claim was denied, and
ordered that the appellant be granted welfare.68
(vi) Students and the welfare system
The plight of people seeking to continue or upgrade their education in Ontario
continues to be a difficult one. Funds available for student assistance shrink
while the costs of education continue to rise. Municipalities resent being
called upon to fill the gap, although educational upgrading may be the only
reasonable hope many people have for long term self-sufficiency.
Most litigation around student welfare stems from its discretionary nature.
Employable people cannot receive welfare as students unless both the course
they seek to attend has been approved by the welfare administrator (and for
post-secondary education, by the Director of Income Maintenance also) and
65. See SARB K-12-09-36 (6 July 1992; Bolduc).; SARB K-07-28-09 (20 May 1992;
Bolduc); SARB K-10-24-20 (8 June 1992; Bolduc).
66. Section 7(1) of the GWA imposes an obligation to provide assistance to any person
in need who "resides in the municipality". GWR s.1(6) now provides that "a person
who resides in Ontario and who is legally authorized to reside in Canada or has
claimed refugee status in Canada shall be deemed to be resident in Ontario."
67. It is the policy of the Canadian government not to deport people to certain countries
even if they do not obtain refugee status and do not qualify for admission on other
grounds.
68. SARB K-10-07-06 (28 Apr. 1992; Allen).
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they have been given individual permission to attend. 69 As with most issues
of discretion in municipal welfare, there are wide variations in how this
discretion is exercised. Many administrators have adopted rules which auto-
matically exclude certain classes of applicants or certain kinds of courses
from consideration.
SARB rendered several decisions in the past year overturning denials of student
welfare based on inflexible policies. The Board has often commented that
welfare administrators may not fetter their discretion by applying policy rules
which do not allow for exception. The Board has also often referred to the
decision of the Divisional Court in Kerr v. Metropolitan Toronto,70 discussed in
this article last year,71 with respect to the importance of education in improving
individuals' long term prospects of remaining off social assistance.72
Unfortunately, the value of litigation in this area remains limited. Access to the
appeal route itself is restricted and often of little value because of the substantial
delays in the process and SARB's policy of refusing to grant interim assistance
in such cases.73 Many students must take educational courses when they are
offered; their welfare eligibility must therefore be determined before or shortly
after school commences. More importantly, even where people do manage to
appeal successfully and are granted benefits, few welfare departments change
their practices as a result of SARB decisions. This problem goes to the funda-
mental issue of SARB's role in social assistance administration, and change is
not likely under the current legislative regime.
Another student welfare problem that cannot be resolved without legislative
action is the rule which makes any student who is eligible for an OSAP grant
ineligible for welfare.74 Welfare administrators interpret this rule to mean
69. GWR s.6(1),
70. (1991), 4 O.R.(3d) 430 (Div.Ct.).
71. Ellsworth & Morrison (1991), 25 to 27.
72. For some examples of SARB decisions emphasizing the importance of an individu-
alized determination of eligibility, see SARB J-11-28-06 (8 Oct. 1991; Novac,
Brooks); SARB J-08-22-15 (4 Nov. 1992; Morrish); SARB J-09-10-01 (3 Feb.
1992; Bolduc); SARB J-07-15-10 (26 Aug. 1991; Brooks, O'Connell); SARB K-06-
16-30 (9 Mar. 1992; O'Connell, Renault, Cardinal).
73. SARB has taken the position that appellants must be treated as if they are not eligi-
ble for assistance as students pending the hearing, and thus will grant only one
month's interim assistance in such cases: SARB Annual Report 90-91, supra, note
37 at 32.
74. GWR s.6(2).
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that if one parent in a family applying for welfare is an ineligible student, the
entire family is disqualified. This rule has caused great hardship to many
Ontario families-in some cases even forcing the parents of young children
to separate so that the family could get assistance while one parent attended
school.75 SARB has affirmed this interpretation. 76
(vii) Income issues in social assistance calculations
Finally, we should note that the Divisional Court is expected to rule sometime
in the next few months on some technical but very important issues concern-
ing how various kinds of payments to social assistance recipients should be
treated in determining the recipients' "income" for social assistance pur-
poses.
The first set of issues has to do with mandatory deductions from other kinds
of social benefits, most commonly Unemployment Insurance. Social assis-
tance delivery agents have always treated these benefits as income (deduct-
ible dollar for dollar from benefits) in the gross amount of the entitlement.
However, UI beneficiaries do not receive the amount of their gross entitle-
ment. Deductions such as income tax are withheld at source from these
benefits. In some cases, UI benefits are also reduced in order to recover
overpayments or through third party garnishments to pay family law support
orders. The result can be to leave the beneficiary destitute, with far less than
even the minimal welfare monthly entitlement.
SARB has considered many appeals on this issue. In almost all cases the
Board has held that social assistance recipients cannot be deemed to have
received income they did not in fact receive, in the absence of express
legislative language. Although the Board has recognized that there are
conflicting social policies at issue, it has usually decided that providing basic
necessities for those in need must prevail.77 The Ontario government has
appealed several of these decisions to the Divisional Court. The cases have
not yet been argued.
75. Information from CRO files based on information provided by caseworkers in
Ontario clinics.
76. SARB K-07-21-32 (10 Mar. 1992; Novac, Brooks); SARB K-07-21-33 (16 Mar.
1992; Brooks, Rangan).
77. E.g., see SARB K-01-30-13 (12 Aug. 1991; Rangan, Douglas); SARB K-09-09-15
(1 June 1992; Renault, O'Connell); SARB K-04-09-03 (30 Mar. 1992; Nikias);
SARB K-05-29-13/K-05-07-08 (10 Mar. 1992; Heath, Nikias); but see contra J-12-
27-12 (3 Jan. 1992; Novac, McLeod), holding that the appellant should be deemed
to have received the portion of his unemployment insurance benefits being garnish-
eed for child support.
Poverty Law in Ontario: The Year in Review
Social assistance recipients have been less successful on some other income
issues which also affect many hundreds or thousands of people. Ontario's
social assistance legislation exempts from consideration as.income or assets
up to $25,000.00 in awards for pain and suffering. 78 Until 1990, people
injured in motor vehicle accidents got this exemption if they got compensa-
tion for pain and suffering. However, problems arose with the establishment
in 1990 of a "no-fault" insurance scheme in Ontario, which provided injured
persons with guaranteed weekly payments in return for removing the right to
sue. Unfortunately, the government also saw this as an opportunity to save
on social assistance costs and determined that no-fault benefits should be
treated as fully deductible income, although the regulations themselves are
silent on the issue. This interpretation has been upheld by SARB.79 This issue
is currently under appeal.
Finally, many people who have lost their jobs and have been forced to turn
to welfare will go to great lengths to try to hold on to their homes--often
their only remaining substantial asset. Sometimes these people borrow
money to make mortgage payments to avoid sale, especially at a time when
real estate values have plummetted. Unfortunately for them, welfare author-
ities have treated the amount of the loans as income and reduced benefits
accordingly, with the result that the recipients not only get no net benefit from
the loans but are left even deeper in debt. Again, although social assistance
regulations do not specifically address this situation, SARB has affirmed the
decisions of the delivery agents.80 An appeal in such a case is pending before
the Divisional Court.81
Technical as these issues may appear to be, the outcomes of these appeals
will affect many thousands of social assistance recipients in Ontario.
78. GWR s.1(1)(k)(iv) (definition of liquid assets), s.13(2) 140 (definition of income);
FBR s.1(1)(a)(vi) (liquid assets), s.13(2) 141 (income).
79. E.g., see SARB K-02-06-16 ([undated]; Draper, Martin, Morrish); SARB J-09-27-
28 (Feb. 1992; O'Connell).
80. See SARB J-08-29-01 (3 June 1991; Morrish, Nikias); SARB K-04-29-14 (28 Oct.
1991; Draper, Morrish).
81. An appeal from SARB J-08-29-01, supra, note 80 is currently before the Ontario
Divisional Court.
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2. WORKER'S COMPENSATION
(a) WCB Funding Strategy
As with other social benefit schemes, the worker's compensation system is
under attack from its employer stakeholders over the funding implications of
the program. And, as with other social benefit schemes, this attack is both the
result of and driven by the continuing recession. As part of its response to
these concerns, the Worker's Compensation Board issued a discussion paper
which proposed solutions to the current "crisis". 82
The focus of the discussion paper is on the WCB's unfunded liability. The
unfunded liability is the difference between the Board's total assets (assess-
ments on employers and income from investments) and its total liabilities
(the estimated future costs of all existing claims).83 This unfunded liability
began to arise in the 1970's as the provincial legislature made adjustments to
benefit levels to account for inflation. No corresponding increase in assess-
ment rates was undertaken to offset this increase in benefit levels. In fact, it
was not until 1984 that the WCB first adopted a funding strategy.84
The goal of this initial funding strategy was to retire the unfunded liability
by the year 2014. This was to have been accomplished by raising assessment
rates to include both the estimated future costs of existing claims (including
the administrative costs of the Board) and a charge to pay down the unfunded
liability.85 However, the effectiveness of this strategy was impeded by both
the current recession (which reduced assessment income) and the amend-
ments to the Worker's Compensation Act 86 which resulted from the passage
of Bill 16287 (which provided injured workers with some additional benefits).
This strategy was further compromised in 1991 when in setting the assess-
ment rates for 1992 the Board based its projections on a more optimistic
outlook for the economy (i.e., increased assessment revenue). Even when that
82. Ontario Worker's Compensation Board, WCB Funding Strategy, (Discussion
Paper), February, 1992.
83. Ibid., at 1. In any given year, if total liabilities exceeds total assets, the unfunded lia-
bility will increase.
84. Ibid. at 5-6. It is unclear why assessment rates were not allowed to keep pace. One
might speculate that it is for the same reason that the WCB is once again forced to
revamp its funding strategy; i.e., a reluctance to impose the actual cost of the com-
pensation system on employers.
85. Ibid. at 7.
86. R.S.O. 1990, c. W-11.
87. S.O. 1989, c. 47.
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outlook was found to be incorrect, the Board did not adjust the rates it had
set.88
The discussion paper examines the pros and cons of five possible funding
strategies. The first would be to retain the present funding strategy and
eliminate the unfunded liability by 2014. The second would involve moving
to a 70% funding ratio by 2014. The third would involve retaining the
commitment to full funding but moving the retirement date to 2024. The
fourth would involve moving to both a 70% funding ratio and moving the
retirement date to 2024. The final strategy would involve a 70% funding ratio,
a retirement date of 2024 and an average assessment rate for the period
1993-1995 stabilized at $3.20.89
The paper does discuss some of the other policy initiatives which the Board
has recently undertaken to reduce the adverse impact of any funding strategy
which might be adopted in future. These include expenditure reductions
through more effective vocational rehabilitation and re-employment mea-
sures, improved and cost-effective service delivery, examining the cost
implications before adopting new policies, increased emphasis on workplace
health and safety and improvement of the WCB's ability to collect assess-
ments.90
On the surface, it is difficult to find fault with the Board's concern over its
funding situation. Neither workers nor employers are apt to be happy with a
scenario in which the Board is unable to meet its future commitments. Some of
the reasons that this situation has arisen are the direct result of actions which the
Board has taken (or not taken, as the case may be). Other causes were beyond
the Board's direct control. However, while the Board has not committed itself
to any of the funding strategies discussed, the fear exists that the discussion of
funding is simply a ruse for both contracting the benefits which the system
already provides and preventing the provision of new benefits.91 A solution
88. Supra, note 82 at 9. The reasons given for not doing so seem to again reflect the
Board's unwillingness to confront employers about the actual cost of the compensa-
tion system.
89. Ibid. at 22-27.
90. Ibid. at 15-18. However, it must be noted that to be successful such measures will
themselves require substantial expenditures.
91. See M. Green, "The Funding of the WCB System - More Important Than It Seems
for Injured Workers", (April, 1992) The IA.V.G.O. Reporting Service, Vol. 6, No. 2,
at 3.
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which favoured employer's economic concerns to the detriment of injured
workers would not sit well with workers or their advocates.
(b) Service Delivery and Vocational Rehabilitation
Perhaps as important as the discussion paper on funding is the Report of the
Chairman's Task Force on Service Delivery and Vocational Rehabilitation. 92
The Task Force's goal was to consult with the Board's major stakeholders
and others (including WCB staff) to assess both immediate and long-term
needs in the areas of service delivery and vocational rehabilitation and to
make recommendations to improve and enhance endeavours in these areas.
While it is difficult to encapsulate all the recommendations contained in the
Report, there are some common themes which bear some notice.
On the service delivery side, the Report noted that while the Board relied on
theAct and the Operational Policy Manual as a substitute for a strategic plan
for the implementation of its legislative obligations, many staff had neither
a copy of theAct nor the Manual.93 Those who did have copies were provided
with little or no training in the interpretation and implementation of the
provisions therein. This factor, combined with the huge caseloads carried by
Board staff, artificial deadlines for decision-making and the assignment of
claims without regard to the complexity of the case or the skill of the staff
member, resulted in poor quality adjudication.94 These same observations
were found to be relevant for Decision Review staff.95
On the vocational rehabilitation side, the Report recognized that successful
medical and vocational rehabilitation will result in a cost savings through
reduced duration of claims.96 However, the Report noted that the Board's
efforts in this area lacked focus; there was no clear identification of the
purpose and objectives of such rehabilitation.97 Many of the observations
92. Ontario Worker's Compensation Board, Report of the Chairman's Task Force on
Service Delivery and Vocational Rehabilitation (July, 1992).
93. Ibid., at 15. Advocates will be pleased to find that one of the recommendations con-
tained in the Report is that the Operational Policy Manual be updated and regularly
maintained, and that all policy directives must be immediately numbered, minuted
and incorporated into the Manual, so as to be readily available to decision-makers. It
is hoped that this recommendation will also apply to manual holders who are not
decision-makers.
94. Ibid., at 23, 27.
95. Ibid., at 81-83.
96. Ibid., at 37.
97. Ibid., at 38.
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which the Report found applicable to service delivery, were also relevant to
vocational rehabilitation. Staff were provided with no practical training and
yet were expected to devise viable vocational rehabilitation plans. Managers
and technical advisors were also found to have little experience in the area
and thus could not provide assistance to caseworkers. Caseloads were found
too high to provide quality service. 98 And, even if vocational rehabilitational
services were activated, they were not likely applied in a timely manner.99
The Report makes several recommendations to remedy the problems which
the Task Force found evident (and which have been evident to injured
workers and their advocates for some time) and suggests that the recommen-
dations can be implemented with the reallocation of existing Board
resources. 100 The Report also urges the Board of Directors to monitor the
implementation of the recommendations and to issue a written progress
report to all stakeholders involved in the consultation process.
Much of the Report is a sweeping indictment of the policy and procedures of
the Board. While injured workers and their advocates may not agree with the
content or extent of all the Report's recommendations, it is hoped that the
Report will at least provide some motivation for an honest reevaluation of
the Board's practices in the areas of service delivery and vocational rehabil-
itation and lead to some necessary reform.
(c) Regulations Governing Reinstatement In
The Construction Industry
A new regulation governing the reinstatement of construction workers,
enacted under authority of section 54(9) of the Act came into force in May
of 1992.101 The regulation provides a somewhat restricted reemployment
obligation for employers in the construction industry. Essentially, the regu-
lation provides that an employer must offer to reemploy a worker who is able
to perform the essential duties of his or her pre-accident employment in a
position in the worker's trade if:
98. Ibid., at 39-42.
99. Ibid., at 43-44. The Report cites as an example a worker in receipt of temporary par-
tial disability benefits being required to conduct an extensive job search before re-
employment alternatives had been canvassed with the accident employer.
100. Of course these recommendations must be viewed in light of the discussion paper
on the funding strategy.
101. 0. Reg. 259/92, effective May 12, 1992.
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(a) there have been no reductions in the workforce since the injury of the
worker;
(b) work within the worker's trade is being performed by someone hired on
or after the date of injury; or
(c) there is an available position in the worker's trade. 102
There are also similar provisions to those contained in section 54 with respect




The issues surrounding reemployment obligations of employers are as con-
tentious as ever. In the past year more and more such cases have reached the
Worker's Compensation Appeals Tribunal. Not surprisingly, the Tribunal's
approach to these issues has not been consistent.1 03
Perhaps the Tribunal decision which sparked the most interest (both positive
and negative) is Decision No. 605/91.104 In that case the worker had suffered
a compensable injury in April of 1990. The Board provided notice to the
employer in July of 1990 that the worker was fit to perform suitable work as
of June 13, 1990. Suitable work was provided in September of 1990, but the
worker was terminated in October, 1990 for the failure to take a drug test.
The first issue which the Panel was called upon to decide was when the
employer's obligation under the reemployment provisions arose. The Panel
found that based upon a plain reading of the statute, the obligation only arose
after the employer received the requisite notice from the Board. 105 It con-
cluded that there was no general obligation upon the employer to reemploy
102. Ibid. The provisions with respect to unionized workers are contained in section 7.
Similar provisions apply with respect to non-unionized workers, see section 11.
103. For a discussion of past Tribunal decisions and the issues surrounding them see
Ellsworth & Morrison (1991) at 35-37.
104. (1991), 21 WCATR 131. For commentary on this case see R. Pauker, "When is the
Employer on Notice", (April, 1992) The I.A.V.G.O. Reporting Service, Vol. 6, No. 2
at 7 and A. Bome "Decision No. 605/91 - Just Cause and Section 54(10) of the
Act", (April, 1992) The I..V.G.O. Reporting Service, Vol. 6, No. 2 at 12.
105. Ibid., at 166. Section 54 (4) and (5) provide that upon receiving notice from the
Board of the worker's fitness, the employer shall offer to reemploy the worker. The
importance of determining when the employer's obligation arises, is because only at
that time do the procedural and legal safeguards contained in the rest of section 54
attach.
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the worker without this notice. 10 6 As the Board in this case had provided the
requisite notice before the worker's termination, the Panel went on to con-
sider the effect of the presumption contained in section 54(10).107 It con-
cluded that in order for an employer to rebut the presumption it was not
necessary to show "just cause" for the dismissal, but only that the dismissal
was not related to the worker's disability or his or her rights under section
54.108 Finally, the Panel considered the standard of proof which must be
satisfied in order to rebut the presumption and concluded that if there were
"any substantial doubt as to whether the stated reasons were the real reasons
or were all the reasons, then the finding must be against the employer". 109
(ii) Permanent Partial Disability Supplements
Decision No. 40/92110 will be of interest to injured worker's and their
advocates. The case involve a consideration of the appropriate circumstances
under which a section 147(2)111 supplement may be cancelled and a 147(4)112
106. However, section 54(1) states that an employer of a worker who as a result of an
injury is unable to work shall offer to reemploy the worker in accordance with this
section. In fact, other decisions of the Tribunal have held that, in situations where
the worker has already returned to work, the employer's obligation does arise even
if there has been no notice from the Board; see Decision No 7161911 (15 May 1992;
Moore, Barbeau, Ferrari) and Decision No. 74619112 (10 June 1992).
107. Section 54(10) provides that where a worker who has been reemployed under the
section is terminated within six months of reemployment, there is a presumption that
the employer has not complied with his or her obligations under the section.
108. Supra, note 104 at 182.
109. Ibid., at 195. The Panel's reasons seem to be that because the rebuttal of the pre-
sumption involved an investigation into the employer's intent, information not
inherently within the knowledge of the worker or the Board, the standard should
necessarily be higher than the civil standard of a balance of probabilities.
110. (2 July 1992; Moore, Ferrari, Shuel).
111. Formerly section 135(2), R.S.O. 1980, c. 539, as amended by S.O. 1989, c. 47. Sec-
tion 147(2) provides:
147(2) Subject to subsections (9) and (10), the Board shall give a suppelement to a
worker who, in the opinion of the Board, is likely to benefit from a vocational reha-
bilitation program which could help to increase the worker's earning capacity to
such an extent that the sum of the worker's earning capacity after vocational rehabil-
itation and the amount awarded for permanent partial disability approximates the
worker's average or net average earnings, as the case may be, before the worker's
injury.
112. Formerly section 135(4), R.S.O. 1980, c. 539, as amended by S.O. 1989, c. 47. Sec-
tion 147(4) provides:
147(4) Subject to subsections (8), (9) and (10), the Board shall give a supplement to
a worker,
(a) who, in the opinion of the Board, is not likely to benefit from a vocational reha-
(1992) 8 Journal of Law and Social Policy
supplement should be substituted. The Panel noted that theAct authorizes the
payment of a 147(4) benefit where the Board concludes that the worker will
not benefit from a vocational rehabilitation program (147(4)(a)) or has not
benefitted (147(4)(b)), to the extent required by subsection (2). The Panel
reasoned that where the Board's decision is based on section 147(4)(b), there
must be evidence of the absence of past benefit and the unlikelihood of further
benefit. 113 In that case, the objective of the worker's vocational rehabilitation
program was to find a job in the worker's field of expertise. The obstacles to
this program were the worker's disability, his age and the economic climate,
but the Panel found that none of these factors made the objective unrealistic
or impractical. The Panel concluded that the worker's vocational rehabilita-
tion services were arbitrarily terminated because of his age. As there was
insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the worker was unlikely to benefit
from future vocational rehabilitational services, the basis for terminating the
worker's 147(2) supplement had not been established. 114
(e) Overpayments
In Decision No. 24F2115 the Tribunal delivered a precedent setting decision
on its jurisdiction over questions of overpayments and the principles to be
exercised in such cases. The case involved an overpayment of over $116,000
in benefits, medical aid and health care costs, which had resulted from a
successful appeal to the Tribunal by the employer. The first issue which the
Panel had to decide was whether it had any jurisdiction to deal with the
overpayment question. The Panel found that it had a general jurisdiction
which included jurisdiction concerning overpayments. This jurisdiction was
found to exist regardless of whether the question arose in appeals from Board
decisions regarding overpayments or in the course of the Tribunal's disposal
of other appeals properly before it.116
The Panel then went on to decide whether the overpayment should be
collected. The Panel stated that the worker was blameless in this case; he had
bilitation program in the manner described in subsection (2); or(b) whose earning capacity after a vocational rehabilitation program is not increased
to the extent described in subsection (2) in the opinion of the Board.
113. Supra, note 110 at 7. The Panel's reasoning seems to be that if the worker still met
the criteria for a section 147(2) benefit, it would be irrelevant that he had not bene-
fitted from previous vocational rehabilitation.
114. Ibid., at 7-8.
115. (10 April 1992; Ellis, Apsey, Cook).
116. Ibid., at 15.
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done nothing which had contributed to the Board's error, he did not suspect that
he was not entitled to the payments and he had relied on the payments and
changed his lifestyle 11 7 To require the worker to make a repayment would result
in a substantial burden. The Panel also found that the employer (a Schedule II
employer) was also blameless and was entitled to be indemnified by the Board
for the amount that the Board had already requisitioned for the payment of
benefits. 118 The Panel concluded that the costs of the claim should be paid for
by all Schedule II employers as an administrative expense. 119
(f) WCAT Charter Jurisdiction
On August 7, 1992 the Tribunal released its final decision in Decision No.
534/90.120 The Panel had released an interim decision in this case, in which
it concluded that it could hear and determine Charter issues. 12 1 However,
subsequent to that decision, the Supreme Court of Canada released its trilogy
of cases on the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals to hear Charter
issues. 122 In light of this, the parties in Decision No. 534/90 filed additional
submissions. The Panel concluded that while the Worker's CompensationAct
did not expressly authorize the Tribunal to decide questions of law (including
Charter questions), it had implicit authority to do so. However, it also found
that the Tribunal's jurisdiction could differ, depending on the issues before
it. On the facts of Decision No. 534/90 the Panel concluded it did not have
jurisdiction to consider the Charter issue, as it would not have authority to
fashion a suitable remedy.12 3
3. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
(a) UI Funding
The biggest change which resulted from the enactment of the amendments
to the Unemployment Insurance Act 124 (which became effective in 1990),
117. Ibid., at 41-42.
118. Ibid., at 42.
119. Ibid.
120. (Ellis, Cook, Apsey).
121. Decision No. 5341901 (1990), 17 WCATR 187.
122. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence and its effect on the jurisdic-
tion of the WCAT, see Ellsworth & Morrison (1991) at 2-12.
123. For a discussion of the Tribunal's concerns over the appropriate remedy, see Ells-
worth & Morrison (1991), note 34 at 10.
124. R.S.C. 1985, c. U-1.
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was that the federal government was no longer responsible for the financing
of any Unemployment Insurance services. 125 This meant that the Unemploy-
ment Insurance system was entirely financed by contributions from employ-
ers and employees. In 1991, the economy was undergoing a recession and a
tremendous degree of restructuring. Due to a rate of unemployment which
averaged close to 11%, there arose a shortfall of over $4 billion in the UI
account. 126 In order to eliminate this deficit, employers and employees were
required to increase their levels of contributions. Beginning January 1, 1992,
the employee contribution rate rose to $3.00 per $100.00 of insurable earn-
ings, while the employer rate rose to $4.20 per $100.00 of employee earn-
ings. 127 This represented a $0.75 increase for employees and a $1.05 increase
for employers from rates as they stood on December 31, 1990.128 It was
envisaged that such an increase would eliminate the deficit by 1995.129
As the recession deepened over the course of 1991 and 1992, there were the
not unexpected cries from many employers that such an increase in payroll
taxes was not justified and hindered competiveness. However, little attention
was paid to the effects of such an increase in rates on those who were still
fortunate enough to have a job. With no corresponding increase in wage rates,
such an increase in contribution rates was sure to result in hardship for those
least able to manage it.
It is in this context which the federal goverfiment's withdrawal from UI
financing must be viewed. Arguably, this would have been an appropriate
situation for the government to have funded the shortfall from monies out of
general revenues (as it would have in previous years). This would have had
the effect of reducing the financial strain on both employers and employees
at a time when they could least afford to bear it, and, to the extent that the
increase in the number of UI claimants was due to economic restructuring,
would have spread that burden throughout the population as a whole. From
the point of view of equity and fairness, it would seem more appropriate that
the shortfall, because of its causes, should be funded by monies raised
through a progressive tax system rather than borne entirely by the employers
125. Ellsworth & Morrison (1991) at 37.
126. Canadian Employment Benefits and Pension Guide Reports, Part I - No. 369, (CCH
Canadian Ltd., 1991) at 4.
127. Canadian Employment Benefits and Pension Guide Reports, Part I - No. 370, (CCH
Canadian Ltd., 1991) at 2.
128. Supra, note 126 at 5.
129. Supra, note 127 at 2.
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and employees who have managed to survive the metamorphosis of the
economy to date.
(b) Litigation Developments
(i) Ul Benefits And Indian Reserves
This year, the Supreme Court of Canada again had an opportunity to consider
a case which involved some aspects of the Unemployment Insurance Act as
well as the tax implications which attach to such benefits. Williams v. The
Queen130 will be important for poverty law advocates who are representing
or have represented natives who are receiving or have received UI benefits.
Williams was a member of an Indian band. In 1984 he was in receipt of UI
benefits. He qualified for such benefits by virtue of his former employment
with a logging company on the reserve. The issue which the Supreme Court
was called upon to determine was whether the benefits received by reason of
such circumstances were exempt from taxation under section 87 of the Indian
Act.131 The Court concluded that they were. However, the location of the
qualifying employment was a very important factor for the Court.132 The
location of the qualifying employment was determined by looking at several
factors, including; where the work was performed, where the employer was
located, where the employee was paid and where the employee lived at the
time. In Williams' case, all of these factors were located on the reserve.
There are two observations about this case which advocates should note.
First, the Court did not decide which of such factors was the most important
for determining the location of the qualifying employment. Any native
recipient who did not fulfil all of these criteria would not clearly be entitled
to an exemption from taxation under section 87 of the Indian Act (nor for an
income tax refund for past benefits which were taxed). Second, the Court did
not examinethe importance of the recipient's residence at the time of receipt,
as Williams lived on the reserve at the time in question. Therefore, if a native
recipient did not presently live on a reserve, he or she would not clearly be
entitled to the exemption (or the refund) either. While the absence of such
facts would not necessarily exclude someone from the exemption or the
refund, their importance would have to be examined in the context of each
individual case.
130. (1992), 90 D.L.R.(4th) 129 (SCC).
131. R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5.
132. Supra, note 130 at 142-143.
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(ii) UI Prosecutions
Another case which will be of interest to practitioners in the Unemployment
Insurance field is R. v. Beals.133 As with Williams, Beals is not strictly a UI
case but it may have repercussions for present and future UI recipients. Beals
had been charged with 26 counts of falsely stating that he had no earnings
while making a claim for benefits, contrary to section 103(1)(a) 134 of the
Unemployment InsuranceAct. There were two issues in the case: (1) whether
a statement which Beals was required to give under certain sections of the
Act, was admissable in the criminal proceeding for breach of the Act, and (2)
whether a 'reverse onus' clause contained in section 93(14) of the Act was a
breach of Beals' right to be presumed innocent.
Section 41(5) and (6) of the Act gave the Commission the power to require
a claimant to provide additional information and/or to attend to do so for the
purposes of determining continuing entitlement to benefits. Pursuant to
section 105 and 106 of the Act, anyone who fails to comply with a provision
of theAct is guilty of an offence and may be subject to a fine or imprisonment.
Beals had responded to such a "notice to report" and, after having been
informed that he might face a penalty or prosecution under the Act, that he
was entitled to retain counsel and that he had the right to remain silent, he
made the incriminating statement to the unemployment insurance investiga-
tor.
Notwithstanding the warning, the Court found that the statement which Beals
made, though compelled by statute, was voluntary, and could therefore not
be excluded under common law principles. 135 The Court then considered
whether the compulsion of a statement by statute violated section 7 of the
Charter.136 The Court found that the right to silence encompassed in section
7 included the freedom from compulsion to answer questions at the investi-
gatory stage. In reaching its conclusion the Court stated:
The problem is not that the investigator is empowered to compel the disclo-
sure of information, which is desirable from a regulatory perspective, but
133. (1991), 68 C.C.C.(3d) 277 (N.S.Co.Ct.).
134. Section 103(1)(a) provides that "Every person is guilty of an offence ... who (a) in
relation to any claim for benefit, makes a statement or representation that he knows
to be false or misleading".
135. Supra, note 133 at 279-280.
136. Section 7 provides:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to
be deprived therof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
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rather that the information disclosed is being used in this criminal proceed-
ing. The accused has been conscripted against himself. This flows from the
... finding that the statement is statutorily compelled. 137
The Court concluded that, because of the serious nature of the Charter
violation, to admit this "self-incriminatory" statement into evidence would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute.138
The Court also considered the constitutionality of section 93(14) of the
Act. 139 The evidence against Beals established that documents were submit-
ted by someone using Beals' name and address and that Beals was employed
at the same time. The Court found that the effect of the 'reverse onus' clause
in section 93(14) in this case was such that, absent Beals presenting evidence
to the contrary, the judge must convict (even if he had a reasonable doubt that
the Beals had signed the documents). The Court concluded that this violated
Beals' right to be presumed innocent, guaranteed by s.11(d) of the Charter.140
The Court did not find that section 93(14) was a "reasonable limit" which
was "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" as required by
section 1 of the Charter.141 The Crown maintained that section 93(14) was
designed "to cut down on the abuse of the unemployment system and
maintain the honor system of obtaining benefits". 142 While the Court found
administrative efficiency to be a laudable objective, it was not a "pressing
and substantial" concern sufficient to justify overriding Beals' Charter
rights.143
137. Supra, note 133 at 280.
138. Ibid., at 280-281.
139. Section 93(14) provides:
In any prosecution for an offence under any Part other that Part III, the production
of a return, certificate, statement or answer required by or under that Part or a regu-
lation, purporting to have been filed or delivered by or on behalf of the person
charged with the offence or to have been made or signed by him or on his behalf is,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof that the return, certificate, state-
ment or answer was filed or delivered by or on behalf of that person or was made or
signed by him or on his behalf.
140. Supra, note 133 at 284.
141. Section 1 provides:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
142. Supra, note 133 at 285.
143. Ibid., at 285.
(1992) 8 Journal ofLaw and Social Policy
(iii) Volunteers And The UI Scheme
Finally, mention should be made of the outcome in Canada (Attorney Gen-
eral) v. Enns.144 At issue in that case was whether UI applicants or benefici-
aries who may be providing unpaid, voluntary services to groups or
organizations were eligible for UI benefits. The claimant in that case died
one week before leave to appeal was granted. The appeal was discontinued,
and the Commission agreed not to proceed against the claimant's estate for
the overpayment which had been confirmed in the Federal Court of Appeal's
decision.
4. CANADA PENSION PLAN
(a) CPP Funding
As with the funding arrangements under the Unemployment Insurance Act,
the funding arrangements under the Canada Pension Plan145 have undergone
revision. New contribution rates for employers and employees became effec-
tive January 1, 1992. The changes occurred in response to an.actuarial report
which projected "that the CPP fund would fall to less than half a year benefit
payout" if the contribution rates were not increased. 146 The new rates are
designed to ensure that the fund will increase to two years benefit payout.147
Contribution rates will be raised over the course of the next twenty five years
to ensure this result.
A Canadian earning the average wage will be required to contribute an extra
$7.00 in 1992, and an extra $42.00 by 1996.148 The combined employer-
employee contribution rate will rise from 4.6% in 1991 to 10.1% in 2016. In
a news release announcing the new contribution rates, it was suggested that
the new rates would not have as large an impact on a worker's take home pay
as the rates might indicate, because CPP contributions are creditable for
personal income taxes.149
144. (1990), 126 N.R. 393 (FCA); leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada granted(1991), 134 N.R. 400. For a discussion of the facts and issues in this case see Ells-
worth & Morrison (1991) at 41.
145. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8, as amended.
146. Canadian Employment Benefits and Pension Guide Reports, Part I - No. 366 (CCH
Canadian Ltd., 1991) at 1.
147. Ibid.
148. Canadian Employment Benefits and Pension Guide Reports, Part I - No. 369, (CCH
Canadian Ltd., 1991) at 2.
149. Ibid.
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(b) Income Tax Amendments
Amendments to the Income Tax Act 150 affecting the payment of lump sum
disability benefits pensions were also enacted in December, 1991.151 Before
the amendments, a recipient of a lump sum disability benefit had that amount
taxed in the year in which it was received. The effect of the amendments is
to allow a recipient to spread the amount of such lump sum payments over
the years to which it applies. This provision will only apply to lump sum
payments received in 1991 and subsequent years. 152
(c) CPP Rehabilitation Initiative
In 1990 Health and Welfare Canada started a pilot project to provide rehabil-
itation and counselling services to a small number of CPP disability benefi-
ciaries. The relative success of this pilot project in assisting recipients to
re-enter the workforce lead to the announcement, in December of 1991, of
the expansion of the initiative. The expansion is to involve an expenditure of
$6 million over five years, and is part of the National Strategy-for the
Integration of Persons with Disabilities.1 53
Since the announcement Health and Welfare has been attempting to identify
disability recipients who would benefit from the program and to contact
organizations in the rehabilitation field who would be willing to participate.
An announcement regarding the commencement of this initiative is expected
in the fall of 1992.154
150. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, as amended.
151. S.C. 1991, c. 49, s. 32(10).
152. Canadian Employment Benefits and Pension Guide Reports, Vol. 2, (CCH Canadian
Ltd, 1991) 5515. See also H. Beatty, "Answers to Your Tax Questions for the 1991
Taxation Year" (1992) 10 ArchType No. 2 at 8-9.
153. Canadian Employment Benefits and Pension Guide Reports, Part I - No. 371, (CCH
Canadian Ltd., 1991) at 7. The National Strategy for the Integration of Persons with
Disabilities is a $158 million program which involves ten federal departments and
their agencies, and is coordinated by Health and Welfare. The goals of the National
Strategy are equal access, economic integration and effective participation for peo-
ple with disabilities in Canadian society.
154. Some advocates have expressed concern that participation in such a program may
jeopardize a recipient's continued entitlement to disability benefits. On several occa-
sions the Pension Appeals Board has held that participation in a training program is
tantamount to the ability to pursue a "substantially gainful occupation", and has thus
rendered the appellant ineligible; see Hamilton (1985), CEB & PGR #8508. However,
pursuant to s.69(2) of the CPP regulations (CRC 1978, c. 385, as amended) the Director
may refer a disability beneficiary for vocational rehabilitation. It is likely that this new
initiative is being pursued under the authority of this section. It is hoped that Health and
(1992) 8 Journal ofLaw and Social Policy
(d) Amendments to The CPP Disability Eligibility Criteria
The past year has seen some substantial improvements in the legislative
criteria governing disability benefits. Perhaps the most significant is the
amendment which will allow people to qualify for a pension who would not
previously have qualified because they had made insufficient contributions
to the Plan.155 The amendment is found in section 44(1)(b)(iv) which now
provides that a disability pension will be payable to a person who:
... is a contributor to whom a disability pension would have been payable at
the time the contributor is deemed to have become disabled had an applica-
tion for a disability pension been received prior to the time the contributor's
application for a disability pension was actually received.156
The effect of this amendment is that an applicant who had met the contribu-
tory requirements under the Plan at the time he or she had become disabled,
and who had continued to be disabled until the time of his or her application
for disability benefits, would be eligible for a pension, regardless of whether
he or she met the contributory requirements at the time of his or her
application.
Health and Welfare has advised that applicants whose files are presently active
(i.e., somewhere in the decision-making process) will be reviewed in light of
these amendments. Those whose files are no longer active (i.e., those who have
been previously refused and did not appeal) will be required to make a new
application before they will be considered under these amendments. 157
Welfare would not conclude that a person is no longer disabled by reason of his or
her participation in such a program.
155. For a discussion of the issues surrounding the contributory requirements, or the "late
application" rules as they are sometimes referred to, see Ellsworth & Morrison
(1991), at 42. Prior to the amendment, to have qualified for a disability pension an
applicant must have made a certain minimum amount of contributions to the Plan
and have applied within a specified time period after having become disabled.
156. (1992), c. 2, s. 1(1), effective June 26, 1992. It should be noted that the same
amendment was made to the criteria governing eligibility for a disabled
contributor's child's benefit. However, the ensuing discussion will focus solely on
the disability pension.
157. H. Beatty "Applied 'Too Late' for CPP Disability?" (1992) 10 ArchType No. 4(b) 20 at
24. Health and Welfare appears to be sending letters to applicants within the system
explaining this legislative change and informing them that their file has been referred to
the Disability Operations Division to determine whether they would have had sufficient
contributions at the time they became disabled. Applicants and their advocates are
advised to contact Health and Welfare if they have not received such a letter and believe
that they may be entitled to a benefit as a result of the new amendments. This will ensure
that the payments will commence at the earliest possible time.
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While this amendment will allow those who would not otherwise have
qualified for a pension to be eligible, at best it will only entitle them to
benefits commencing twelve months prior to their application. People who
became disabled at some earlier date, but did not apply for benefits at that
time, will not be entitled to benefits back to the date of their disability. This
outcome is the result of the "deemed disability" section of the Plan.158 This
section restricts the date of disability to fifteen months prior to the date of
application. Pursuant to section 69 of the Plan, disability benefits are payable
in the fourth month following the month in which an applicant is disabled. 159
Other arguments will be necessary in order to rectify this seeming injus-
tice.160
Another amendment which affects the application for benefits, and which
may be most relevant for disabled applicants, concerns the incapacity to make
applications. 161 Section 60(8) provides that where an application is made on
behalf of a person, and the Minister is satisfied that the person was incapable
of forming the intention to make an application on his or her own behalf on
the date the application was made, the Minister may deem the application to
have been made the later of
(a) the month preceding the first month in which the benefit could have com-
menced to be paid; or
(b) the month the Minister considers the person's last relevant period of inca-
pacity to have commenced. 162
Section 60(9) provides that where an application is nmade on behalf of a
person, and the Minister is satisfied that
158. Supra, note 145, s.42(2)(b).
159. Ibid s.69.
160. In fact, several advocates in community legal clinics throughout Ontario are con-
templating or in the process of making arguments that the "deemed disability" pro-
vision violates the equality rights section of the Charter. If successful, the result will
render the "deemed disability" section "of no force or effect", pursuant to section 52
of the Constitution Act, 1982, thereby entitling qualifying applicants to benefits
back to the date of their disability.
161. Subsections 60(8)-(11), enacted by S.C. 1991, c. 44, s. 14, effective January 27,
1992. Similar provisions govern the application for a division of pension credits, see
sections 55.3(1)-(4).
162. Ibid.
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(1) the person had been incapable of forming or expressing an intention to
make an application at some time before the application was made but had
ceased to be incapable before the date of the application, and
(2) the application was made at some time between the date the incapacity
ceased and a period (not exceeding twelve months) comprising the same
number of days as the period of incapacity,
the Minster may deem the application to be made the later of
(a) the month preceding the first month in which the benefit could have com-
menced to be paid; or
(b) the month the Minister considers the person's last relevant period of inca-
pacity to have commenced.
163
For the purpose of sections 60(8) and (9) the period of incapacity must be
continuous unless otherwise stated.
There are a few observations which may be made about this set of amend-
ments. They only apply to individuals who were incapacitated on or after
January 1, 1991. However, they do seem to remedy the situation where the
individual's disability is precisely the reason that he or she cannot make an
application for benefits. Further, they provide the Minister with the discretion
to deem a date of application at some earlier point in time than the actual date
of application, which in turn makes benefits payable at an earlier date. 164 This
should be viewed in contrast with the situation which will ensue under
subsection 44(1)(b)(iv).
(e) Disabled Contributor's Child's Benefit
As a direct result of the Blais decision 165 section 74(4) has been repealed. 166
Section 74(4) had prohibited the payment of a disabled contributor's child's
benefit to a child who became a child of the disabled contributor after the
contributor became disabled, unless the child was a natural child or legally
adopted child of the contributor. Effectively, section 74(4) discriminated
against factually adopted children of a disabled contributor.
163. Ibid. Where the period of incapacity is fewer than thirty days, the application must
be made within one month after the person's incapacity ceased.
164. Again, this is by reason of the interaction of section 42(2)(b) and section 69.
165. Minister of National Helath and Welfare v. Armand Blais (1991), CEB & PGR
#8626. For a discussion of this case see Ellsworth and Morrison (1991) at 46-47.
166. S.C. 1991, c. 44, s. 18, effective January 27, 1992.
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(f) Amendments to The CPP Appeal Process
The long awaited amendments to the appeal process were finally proclaimed
in force on January 27, 1992.167 There are several provisions which will be
of importance to advocates in this area.
First, the time limit to apply for a reconsideration to the Minister, pursuant
to section 81(1), has been reduced from twelve months to ninety days,
although the Minister may extend this time period either before or after it has
expired. 168
Second, the provisions which provide for the creation and constitution of the
Review Tribunal are now in force. Aperson who is dissatisfied with a decision
of the Minister may appeal to the Review Tribunal within ninety days of the
Minister's decision or within such longer period as the Commissioner of
Review Tribunals may allow. 169 A Review Tribunal shall be appointed from
a panel of between one hundred and four hundred persons. At least twenty-
five percent of the panel must consist of lawyers, twenty five per cent of the
panel must be qualified to practice medicine or a related profession, and there
must be members from all regions of Canada. AReview Tribunal shall consist
of three persons, the chair of which shall be a lawyer and, if the appeal
involves a disability benefit, at least one member shall be qualified to practice
medicine or a related profession. 170
(g) Amendments to The Federal Court Act
Finally, amendments to the Federal Court Act 17 1 will have an impact on the
CPP decision making process. Section 28(1)(d) of the Federal CourtAct now
provides that the Federal Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear and
determine applications for judicial review in respect of the Pension Appeals
Board. An application for judicial review must be made within thirty days
167. See Ellsworth & Morrison (1991) at 42.
168. S.C. 1991, c. 44, s. 20, proclaimed in force January 27, 1992.
169. S.C. 1991, c. 44, s. 21(1), proclaimed in force January 27, 1992; S.C. 1992, c. 1, s.
24(1), effective February 28, 1992.
170. S.C. 1991, c. 44, s. 21(1), proclaimed in force January 27, 1992. Section 74.3 of the
regulations states that, for the purposes of the Review Tribunal, a prescribed related
profession is audiology, biomedical engineering, chiropractics, dental therapy, den-
tistry, dietetics, medical physics, nursing, occupational therapy, opticianry, optome-
try, osteopathy, pharmacology, physiotherapy, psychology, respiratory therapy,
speech pathology and speech therapy.
171. R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, as amended by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 5, s. 8, proclaimed in force
February 1, 1992.
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from the time the decision in question is first communicated to the party
directly affected, although the time may be extended before or after the
expiration of thirty days by a judge of the Federal Court of Appeal. 172
However, in a proper case, an application for judicial review may be made
to the Trial Division of the Federal Court in respect of a decision of the
Minister or the Review Tribunal. 173
(h) Litigation Developments
There have been some notable decisions from the Pension Appeals Board
which will be of interest to CPP practitioners.
(i) Disability pensions
In Marinakis174 the Pension Appeals Board considered the case of a claimant
who had been receiving a retirement pension since February, 1988. On May
1, 1989 he suffered a stroke, and subsequently applied for a disability
pension. Those familiar with the Canada Pension Plan will know that a
retirement pension can only be cancelled in favour of a disability pension if
the date of onset of disability is within six months after the date on which the
retirement pension became payable. 175 While there was no dispute that the
claimant had become disabled as a result of the stroke, the Minister argued
that the date of onset of disability was more than six months after the
retirement pension became payable. However, the claimant introduced evi-
dence that he suffered from a number of different ailments, commencing as
early as 1985, which culminated in the stroke of May 1, 1989. Despite these
ailments, the claimant went to work in August of 1988 because of financial
pressures, although his employer testified that he only allowed the claimant
to remain on the job because he felt sorry for him. The Pension Appeals Board
concluded that, due to the number of serious ailments, the claimant was
disabled as of July 1, 1988. They reasoned that he was not capable of
substantially gainful employment as of that date, and that he should not be
penalized because of his employer's kindness. The claimant was therefore
entitled to request the cancellation of his retirement pension in favour of a
disability pension.
172. Ibid. s.28(1) and (2).
173. Ibid. s. 18.
174. Emmanual Marinakis v. Minister of National Health and Welfare (1991), CEB &
PGR #9201. The appellant was represented by West End Legal Services in Ottawa.
175. Supra, note 145, s. 46.2(2).
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Another commendable decision by the Board is Herritt.176 In that case the
clinical medical evidence indicated that the claimant's physical limitations
were not sufficient to preclude her from some form of gainful employment.
However, the claimant's testimony indicated that her physical condition had
progressively deteriorated and that the degree of her pain had progressively
increased. The Board noted:
There might possibly exist in Mrs. Herritt some degree of functional overlay,
in that she, in all truth and in her own mind, is unquestionably convinced
that she does, in fact, suffer in the manner which she described, and to the
extent that she described it, with the result that she could not cope with the
challenge of finding a place for herself in the workforce, despite the strong
medical evidence to the contrary.177
The Board found that on the facts of this case this "functional overlay" was
sufficient to offset the medical opinions, and found the claimant eligible for
a disability pension.
The result in Johnston178 was not so favourable. The claimant in that case
had been denied a disability pension because she had insufficient contribu-
tions. She argued that the differing (and more onerous) contributory criteria
for disability pensions, as opposed to all other pensions under the Canada
Pension Plan, violated section 15 of the Charter.179 While the Board
accepted that there were different preconditions and standards used in deter-
mining eligibility for a disability pension than for all other benefits, it did not
consider this to amount to discrimination. The Board concluded that the
Canada Pension Plan had "two fundamentally different, and mutually exclu-
sive, components". The retirement/survivor's benefit was designed to pro-
vide replacement income to a contributor (or his or her dependants) when a
contributor was required to withdraw from the workforce, due to age or death.
The disability benefit was a form of compensation to a contributor who was
required to leave the workforce as a result of physical or mental disability.
These differing components necessitated different criteria of eligibility. As
176. Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Trudell Herritt (1991), CEB & PGR
#9209.
177. Ibid
178. Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Helen Johnston (1991), CEB & PGR
#9214.
179. Pursuant to sections 44(1)(b) and 49 a disability pension was only payable to a con-
tributor who had made contributions in either of five of the last ten years in his or
her contributory period, two of the last three years in his or her contributory period
or for two years, if there are less than two years in the contributory period.
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all persons who applied for either benefit were subject to the applicable
criteria for that benefit, the Board reasoned that the differing criteria were
not discrimatory. 180
(ii) Definition of "Spouse"
One final case of note is Decoux.181 In that case the Board had to determine
whether a common law spouse was entitled to survivor's benefits. Pursuant
to section 2 of the Canada Pension Plan, in order for a common law spouse
to be entitled to benefits the spouse must show that they were cohabiting with
the contributor at the time of death and that they had cohabited continuously
for at least one year. In this case the claimant had lived with the contributor
for over sixteen years, but she had been separated from him for a period of
four months (although they later reconciled) in the year before his death. At
issue was whether the "continuous period of one year" had to be immediately
preceding the contributor's death. The Pension Appeals Board concluded that
once a conjugal relationship had been established (through an examination
of the intention of the parties) it was only necessary that there was cohabita-
tion between the spouses in such a relationship at the time of the contributor's
death and that at least one year of that relationship was continuous.
D. THE CONSTITUTION, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND POVERTY LAW
In this last section we examine developments in Charter and human rights
law. There are many factors contributing to poverty, and the effects of
deliberate or systemic discrimination against individuals, whether in respect
of housing, employment opportunities or distribution of social benefits are
important. To the extent that the Charter and human rights legislation may
help overcome discrimination, they may help people move out of positions
of economic disadvantage.
1. CHARTER JURISPRUDENCE-GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
We have already seen that the Charter has had little impact on the substance
of social welfare programs in the past year, although cases such as Beals1 82
indicate that it may have some consequences for the policing of social welfare
schemes through the criminal justice system. We will consider the caselaw
180. For a critique of the specious reasoning in this case see, infra, at 204.
181. Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Elaine Decoux and Ruth Decoux (1991),
CEB & PGR #9203.
182. Supra, note 133 and following text.
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dealing with substantive poverty law issues further below. However, we will
first mention some general developments with respect to the Charter which
may have an impact on further litigation in this area.
(a) Remedies For Charter Violations
One of the most important Charter decisions of the year for equality rights
was the landmark decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Schacter v.
Canada.183 In Schacter, it will be recalled, the Trial Division of the Federal
Court held that the Unemployment InsuranceAct violated s.15 of the Charter
because new adoptive parents were given more generous leave than biolog-
ical parents. 184 Strayer J. ordered that benefits be extended in accordance
with his ruling. The government chose not to appeal the main ruling and
subsequently amended the legislation. It did, however, appeal on the issue of
remedies, arguing that where benefits legislation violated s.15, a court's only
option was to declare the legislation unconstitutional and leave it to the
legislature to decide whether the legislation would be changed. The govern-
ment lost at the Federal Court of Appeal185 and appealed further to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. In the process it
issued a complex set of guidelines for courts to follow in granting Charter
remedies.
The Schacter decision has several positive aspects. The Court easily rejected
the government's argument that courts could never extend underinclusive
legislation which was found to violate s.15, saying that "equality with a
vengeance" was contrary to the fundamental purposes of the Charter.186 The
Court also held that in remedying constitutional violations, judges are not to
be constrained by technical drafting issues but may look to the real substance
of the legislation and may even "read in" language to make the legislation
comply with the Charter.
On the other hand, the Court sounded several cautionary notes about the
exercise of this power, which will be of special concern to those litigating
issues of entitlement to social benefits. The decision holds that courts may
183. (9 July 1992), File No. 21889 (S.C.C.) [not yet reported].
184. [1988] 3 F.C. 555,52 D.L.R.(4th) 653.
185. [1990] 2 F.C. 129, 66 D.L.R.(4th) 635.
186. Supra, note 183 at 69. The phrase "equality with a vengeance" was adopted by the
Court from the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (an intervenor in the
case). LEAF used the phrase to describe the approach of courts who responded to
findings that benefits legislation discriminated by striking down the legislation so
that no one got anything.
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not add to what legislatures have done unless it can be safely assumed that
the legislature would have so acted had it been given the choice. It suggests
that particular caution should be exercised where what is claimed is a social
benefit which is not itself a fundamental right: "For example, in a benefits
case, it may not be a safe assumption that the legislature would have enacted
a benefits scheme if it were impermissible to exclude certain parties from
entitlement under that scheme". 187 The Court was particularly concerned that
judges respect budgetary constraints on legislatures and not make orders
which might, by extending benefits to one disadvantaged group, cause others
to be deprived.
In the end, the Court concluded that in the case before it, benefits should not
have been extended. In a comment which may have some impact on how
government lawyers deal with such cases in the future, the Court expressed
strong dissatisfaction that the substantive equality was not before it and that
it was faced with ruling on the substantive issue without an adequate s.1
record before it.188 Noting that the group to which benefits were to be
excluded was much larger than the group of adoptive parents to whom they
were being compared-and also noting with the advantage of hindsight that
Parliament's legislative response was different from what the lower court had
ordered-the Court held that this was not an appropriate case to make an
order extending benefits.
The Schacter Court's approach to judicial activism in relation to social
welfare benefits is generally conservative, but in the end seems to strike a
fairly reasonable balance between the demands of the Charter and wholesale
intervention into the legislative realm. In any event, it will have to be studied
carefully by all people seeking to assert equality claims in respect of govern-
mental benefits.
(b) Gay And Lesbian Rights Affirmed
After several unsuccessful attempts by gay and lesbian litigants to challenge
discrimination against them through the courts, gay litigants scored important
victories in close succession. The Ontario Court of Appeal in HaigI89 and a
Human Rights Board of Inquiry in Leschner190 held, respectively, that the
187. Ibid. at 19.
188. Ibid. at 15, 36.
189. Haig and Birch v. The Queen (6 Aug. 1992), No.774/91 (Ont. C.A.) [unreported].
190. Re Leschner (31 August 1992), Ont. H.R. Bd. of Inquiry (Cumming, Dawson,
Plaut).
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Canadian Human RightsAct 91 and the Ontario Human Rights Code192 violated
s.15 of the Charter by failing to protect citizens against discrimination on
grounds of sexual orientation. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in Haig had no
difficulty in deciding that even taking into consideration the cautions expressed
by the Supreme Court in Schacter, it should "read in" protection against
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. The Court refused to believe
that Parliament would prefer to abolish its human rights legislation over amend-
ing it to include a prohibition against sexual orientation discrimination.
If these decisions stand, the question of whether same-sex couples must be
treated the same as other spousal units may have to be examined across a
broad range of social welfare programs. Ironically, this result may not always
work to the advantage of same sex couples in programs such as social
assistance. It remains to be seen how far governments will go in equating the
treatment of heterosexual and homosexual relationships.
2. SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMS AND THE CHARTER
In a previous article in this journal, Ian Morrison analyzed a number of
Charter decisions dealing specifically with social benefits programs.1 93 The
article noted that Charter litigants had had little success in this area and
suggested that judges interpreting the Charter are deeply committed to a
paradigm of rights as, in the words of Justice Bertha Wilson, "an invisible
fence over which the state will not be allowed to trespass". 194 Claims of rights
in respect of social benefits, themselves already an intrusion into the "natu-
ral" world of private social and economic ordering, do not fit comfortably
into this paradigm. The idea that individuals might have the right to ask the
state to come inside "the invisible fence" and lend a hand rarely meets with
judicial favour. Even equality claims which were based on arguments of
discriminatory treatment rather than claims of absolute entitlement to social
benefits often saw this distinction elided.
The article also noted that not only had most Charter claims in respect of
social benefits programs failed, but that judges were reluctant in most cases
to find even aprimafacie Charter violation, thus avoiding the need to engage
in the explicit balancing of interests required by s.1. Section 7 claims were
191. R.S.C. 1985, c.H-6.
192. R.S.O. 1990, c.H-19.
193. I. Morrison, "Poverty Law and the Charter: The Year In Review" (1990), 6 J.L. &
Social Pol'y 1. [hereinafter "Morrison (1990)"].
194. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at 164.
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routinely rejected as involving unprotected, "mere" economic interests.
Equality claims met with little more success, especially those which had to
rely on theories of adverse impact rather than direct discrimination. The
article identified some common techniques used in cases to avoid the char-
acterization of various programs or actions as discriminatory. We suggest that
similar themes can be identified in the more recent caselaw.
One such technique is to deny that the claimant's disadvantage is caused in
any relevant way by the law in question, to transfer accountability for
problems to "natural" or personal causes. Thus, in earlier cases, courts found
that people with AIDS were not disadvantaged because the state would not
pay for their full medication costs; they were disadvantaged because they had
a disease and were not willing to adjust their "lifestyles" accordingly. 195
People who lived in underfunded nursing homes had no disadvantage
imposed on them by the state, because they "chose" to live there. 196
Courts have taken similar approaches in the recent cases. In Fernandes v.
Director,197 the disabled appellant sought the means to allow him to live in
the community rather than as a long term hospital in-patient. The Manitoba
Court of Appeal began by making it clear that they thought the very request
was presumptuous, stating:
The personal choices of a particular individual are not generally to be con-
sidered when those choices affect the public purse ... [Tihe desire to live in
a particular setting does not constitute a right protected under s.7 of the
Charter. Fernandes does not acquire any rights to a particular style of living
as a result of his need for an allowance ...198
Having disposed of the s.7 argument, the Court went on to dismiss the
equality argument on the grounds that there was no connection between the
appellant's disability and his disadvantage:
Femandes is not being disadvantaged because of any personal characteristic
or because of his disability. He is unable to remain community based
because he was no caregiver, because he must rely upon public assistance
and because the facilities available to meet his needs are limited. 199
195. Morrison (1990), supra, note 193, discussing Brown v. British Columbia (Minister
of Health) (1990), 66 D.L.R.(4th) 444 (B.C.S.C.).
196. Ibid., discussing Ontario Nursing Home Association v. Ontario (1990), 74 O.R.(2d)
365 (H.C.J.).
197. Supra, note 46.
198. Ibid. at 21.
199. Ibid. at 23.
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Perhaps most remarkable about Fernandes is that in its determination to show
that there were no constitutionally cognizable interests presented by the case,
the Court ignored evidence-before it but not adverted to in the decision-
not only that continued hospital living was seriously harmful to Fernandes,
but that it was far more expensive to the taxpayer to keep Fernandes in
hospital than to pay for him to have community care!
In Sparks v. Dartmouth HousingAuthority,200 it was argued that the exclusion
of public housing tenants from statutory protections afforded private market
tenants amounted to adverse impact discrimination on grounds of race, family
status and receipt of social assistance, because public housing tenants were
disproportionately black single mothers on social assistance. The Nova
Scotia County Court agreed that the recipients were members of disadvan-
taged groups within the meaning of s. 15 and that they were disproportionately
represented in the group affected by the laws applying to public housing
tenants, but denied the application. It found that "what we are dealing with
in this case is an individual's merits and capacities and not an individual's
personal characteristics" 201 and went on to explain this surprising discovery
thus:
The restrictions imposed by ... the Act are not imposed as a result of any
characteristic of race or sex or source of income, but rather by virtue of hav-
ing individually applied and individually been accepted for public housing.
It is not a characteristic of being black that one resides in public housing.
Similarly, it is not a characteristic of being a single mother or a female that
one resides in public housing. The fact that there is a disproportionately large
number of blacks, women and recipients of social assistance in public hous-
ing does not, in my opinion, make it characteristic of any of the three groups
individually or the three groups considered as one group.202
This passage is particularly interesting, in that it constitutes an almost perfect
inversion of the concept of constructive discrimination. By asking whether
it is characteristic of being black that one resides in public housing, rather
than asking whether it is a characteristic of public housing tenants dis-
proportionately to be black, the concept of constructive discrimination is
rendered fundamentally incoherent.
Another characteristic aspect of such cases is the judicial reluctance to
examine the validity of distinctions drawn by legislators rather than the ones
200. (13 April 1992), Halifax No. 75171 (N.S.Co.Ct.) [unreported].
201. IbL at 26.
202. Ibi
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drawn by legislation.203 Agood example of this is the decision of the Pension
Appeals Board in Johnston.204 The Board seems to have accepted the
legislative distinction between CPP disability benefits and retirement bene-
fits as its own justification. Because one provided benefits on the basis of age
(a "compulsory savings scheme") while the other provided benefits on the
basis of disability (a "quasi-insurance scheme"), they could not be compared.
It is suggested that the Johnston case has for all intents and purposes
reintroduced to the analysis of equality rights claims in regard to benefits
legislation the "similarly situated" test formally abandoned in Canadian
equality jurisprudence.205 An even more extreme example of this can be seen
in Gosselin,206 where despite a legislative distinction based directly (no
question of adverse impact) on age (an enumerated ground under s.15), the
Court suggested that there was not even aprimafacie case of discrimination.
Finally, mention should be made of the decision of the Ontario Divisional
Court in Thunder Bay Seaway Non-Profit Apts. v. Thunder Bay.2 07 This was
an application for an order to compel a municipality to sell property to an
organization wishing to provide non-profit housing to rehabilitated alcohol-
ics and substance-abusers. The organization was joined in the application by
two individuals who would have qualified for housing. The municipality had
approved the sale until it learned of the nature of the proposed residents. A
resolution to sell the property was then defeated in the municipal Council. In
finding that no s.15 rights had been affected, the Court stated:
To decide whether or not there has been a s.15 Charter violation, one takes
the impugned law, holds it up to s.15 and decides whether the law infringes,
in whole or in part, s.15 of the Charter. That cannot be done in this case
because no law was passed; ... 208
The extraordinary implication of this reasoning is that the Charter cannot
reach even the most blatant discrimination by government, as long as the
discrimination results from inaction rather than action.
203. See Morrison (1990), supra note 193 at 25.
204. Supra, note 178.
205. In the seminal s.15 decision in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989]
1 S.C.R. 143.
206. Supra note 45.
207. (1991), 5 O.R.(3d) 667 (Div.Ct.).
208. Ibid. at 677.
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A fuller analysis of all the doctrinal and ideological implications of these
cases is not possible here. It is suggested however, that there is nothing in the
recent Charter jurisprudence to indicate that judicial attitudes to claims in
respect of social benefits programs have changed. Not only have the courts
consistently rejected any idea that the Charter might impose a positive
obligation on the state to provide social benefits, but they have refused even
to scrutinize social benefits programs closely. By examining only the distinc-
tions drawn by laws, rather than the distinctions drawn by lawmakers, courts
have effectively reduced equality analysis in this area to the sterile formalities
of the old "similarly situated" test, thus avoiding the more difficult-and
more openly ideological-questions that would follow on a finding of dis-
crimination and a s.1 inquiry into its justification.
3. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACCORD
The dominant news item of the past year has of course been the lengthy
constitutional negotiations which ended, shortly before the time of writing,
with the Charlottetown constitutional Accord. Despite constitutional fatigue,
we must at least mention some of the issues in the negotiations that have
been-and will be-of special concern to poverty law advocates.
The text of the Charlottetown Accord provides in part as follows: 209
A new provision should be added to the Constitution describing the commit-
ments of the governments, Parliaments and the legislatures within the federa-
tion to the principle of the preservation and development of Canada's social
and economic union. The new provision ... should not be justiciable.
The policy objectives set out in the provision on social union should include
but not be limited to:
providing adequate social services and benefits to ensure that all individ-
uals resident in Canada have reasonable access to housing, food and
other basic necessities ...
A mechanism of monitoring the Social and Economic Union should be
determined by a First Minister's Conference.
What will this commitment mean to all the individuals resident in Canada who
require housing, food and other basic necessities? It is impossible to answer this
question at this time, but one is tempted to the cynical conclusion that the Social
209. This text is taken from the August 28 revised draft text of the Charlottetown agree-
ment, as reproduced in the [Toronto] Globe and Mail (1 September 1992) Al, A8.
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and Economic Union Clause was acceptable to all the players involved
because, in the absence of an enforcement mechanism, it means nothing.
The Charter itself will not be amended. A proposal to add property rights to
the interests protected by s.7 ("life, liberty and security of the person"),
strongly opposed by most anti-poverty activists and poverty law advocates,
was dropped from the final round of negotiations. 210
The Accord may however have indirect implications for Charter litigants.
The Accord provides that a new provision should be drafted "to clarify the
possible relationship between the new section and the existing Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms", but does not suggest what the negotiators'
in fact believed this possible relationship to be. It further provides that a
clause should be added to the Constitution stating that the Social and Eco-
nomic Union does not abrogate or derogate from the Charter.
Some advocates have expressed concern that the existence of a section
dealing specifically with social and economic rights may encourage courts
to conclude that the Charter does not contain any such rights. However, in
the absence of any sign from the courts that they will read such rights into
the Charter in any event, it seems that the proposed Clause holds little in the
way of either threat or promise.
Finally, disability advocacy groups have reacted angrily to the fact that the
last draft of the so-called "Canada clause" establishes a constitutional com-
mitment to sexual and racial equality, but fails to mention the rights of people
with disabilities.211 They have expressed concern that equality rights for
people with disabilities under s.15 of the Charter could take second place to
other equality rights.
4. OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS
(a) The Ontario Human Rights Review
For years, the enforcement of human rights in Ontario has suffered from
problems of accessibility, delays, and the investigative and settlement pro-
cess. Many people, frustrated with the process, have not considered it
worthwhile to pursue human rights complaints.
210. Ibid.
211. G. York, "Accord puts handicapped in jeopardy, coalition says", The Globe and
Mail (4 September 1992).
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In December, 1991, the government appointed a Task Force, chaired by Mary
Cornish, to review the human rights enforcement system and to recommend
procedural changes. The government announced its intention to amend the
Code as soon as possible after receiving the Task Force recommendations.
Several community legal clinics assisted client groups to make submissions. In
addition, a committee of representatives from 18 Clinics, coordinated by the
Clinic Resource Office, drafted and submitted to the Task Force two briefs, one
with recommendations for the structure of the complaint system as a whole, and
the other addressing priorities in complaint-handling and refusal of complaints.
The Task Force released its report in June 1992, recommending numerous
changes to the legislation and its administration.212 At the time of writing,
there has been no legislative response to the report. While the government
reports optimistically in the Legislature concerning attempts to reduce the
Ontario Human Rights Commission's backlog, it is unlikely that elimination
of the backlog or prevention of backlog in the future can be accomplished
without massive expenditure, legislative change, or both.
(b) Employment Equity
Many people would argue that employment equity legislation is the "next
generation" in human rights legislation and, properly crafted, may be the only
effective means of eliminating discrimination in the workplace. There has
been some progress on this front, although it has been less than dynamic.
Employment equity was the subject of an NDP Private Member's Bill 213
when the NDP were in opposition. Bill 172 was closely modeled on the Pay
Equity Act.214 Following the September 1990 election, equity-seeking
groups, who had expected that the government would reintroduce Bill
172, were surprised and disappointed when the government announced
that it would hold consultations with a view to developing a completely
new Bill.
The government appointed a reputable lawyer and activist from Quebec,
Juanita Westmoreland-Traore, as Employment Equity Commissioner,
although her sole mandate was to hold consultations. A report on the consul-
tations was published.215 On June 25, 1992, the government tabled Bill 79,
212. Report of the Ontario Human Rights Code Review Task Force: "Achieving Equal-
ity: A Report on Human Rights Reform" (Ontario Ministry of Citizenship: 1992)(Chair: Mary Cornish).
213. Bill 172, introduced on May 29, 1990.
214. R.S.O. 1990 c. P-7.
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An Act to provide for Employment Equity forAboriginal People, People with
Disabilities, Members of Racial Minorities and Women (the Employment
Equity Act). The government is now consulting in order to produce regula-
tions. Bill 79 is likely to receive second reading in the Fall 1992 session.
The Bill is disappointing. As with the Pay Equity Act, coverage is limited in
the private sector to employers with 50 or more employees, and the applica-
tion of the Act is "phased in" over a 3-year period. There is no provision
concerning related employers. There is no mandatory posting. Further, the
Act appears effectively to suspend the application of the Ontario Human
Rights Code vis-a-vis workplaces that have employment equity plans. Per-
haps most disturbingly, provisions that would define what an employment
equity plan must be based on and how it must operate are missing; the Bill
provides that these areas will be dealt with through regulations. It is impossi-
ble, on reading the Bill, to arrive at an understanding of what the employer's
actual obligations would be.
(c) An Ontarians With Disabilities Act?
Finally, while on the subject of new human rights initiative, we should report
on the early stages of a proposal for an Ontarians With Disabilities Act. No
such legislation currently exists, even in draft, but the Advocacy Resource
Centre for the Handicapped (ARCH) has been given a grant from the Ontario
Ministry of Citizenship to begin development of such legislation. ARCH has
called on members of the community to bring forward their ideas and
proposals.216 The government has not committed itself to such legislation,
but the NDP supported the idea of an ODA when in opposition.217
E. CONCLUSIONS
We concluded last year's review by commenting that despite the economic
downturn and the effects of the recession, the election of an NDP government
and initial movement on a number of outstanding issues raised some hopes
for the upcoming year. Unfortunately, the events of the year have made it
hard to sustain much degree of optimism for the immediate future. Ontario's
economic problems have turned out to be even more fundamental than almost
215. Ontario: Opening Doors: a Report on the Employment Equity Consultations
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1992) (Chair: Westmoreland-Traore).
216. 10 ArchType No.4(a) (Special Edition) "Developing an Ontarians With Disabilities
Acf' (July 1992).
217. Ibid.
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anyone thought. The government is increasingly embattled and has either
forgotten some of its promises or has quietly dropped them as being too
politically risky.
This has of course placed tremendous pressures on poverty law advocates.
As we noted at the outset, caseworkers in legal clinics have been over-
whelmed by increasing demands by desparate people for assistance, at a time
when focussing energies on opportunities for systemic change are more
important than ever. It has been a difficult and frustrating year in many ways,
as so many caseworkers have reported. The amount that people have in fact
been able to accomplish both in individual cases and as systemic action, in
light of these obstacles, is commendable.
We will conclude by saying that, whatever the frustrations of working in this
area at a time when cleaning the Augean stables may seem preferable to
confronting the tasks at hand, there can surely be no more important time to
do so.
